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I. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has been controversial in America 
since 1932, when Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means charged that 
most public companies are run not in the interests of their 
supposed owners, the shareholders, but of the companies' own 
managers. 1 Of course, corporate executives and their operatives 
(like corporate lawyers) liked this arrangement. Most academics 
did not. Their critiques varied but generally fell into two camps. 
One denounced the failure of public companies to maximize 
shareholder interests; the other (the "progressives") decried their 
failure to serve other corporate constituencies (like employees 
and consumers) and the public interest (as they defined it).2 Each 
camp offered diverse solutions to the problem it perceived. 
1. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 124 (1932). 
2. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law 
Agenda, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 669-70, 672-75 (2002) (introducing the distinction 
between the shareholder wealth maximization form of corporate governance and the more 
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Oflate the debate has shifted. Although two factions remain, 
one devoted to shareholder interests, the second to other 
constituencies and the public, many academics in each camp now 
defend the status quo as an effective means to the ends it favors. 
The supposed champions of shareholders call the dominant 
corporate governance mode "director primacy";3 progressives dub 
it the "team production"4 (or "mediating") model. This astonishing 
concurrence of ancient foes prompts the obvious question of 
whether both can be right. More fundamentally, with the 
memory of Enron, Tyco, and other scandals still fresh, and with 
widespread complaints about executive compensation, can it be 
that the status quo is truly Nirvana, the best of all possible 
corporate governance worlds? 
This Article probes both theories and finds them deluded. 
Berle and Means are still right: the status quo is not director 
primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production, but CEO 
primacy-governance by managers largely for their own benefit. 
The interests not only of shareholders but of other constituencies 
and the public would fare better with shareholder primacy. 
"Shareholder voice is an idea that hasn't been tried, not one that 
has failed. "5 
Part I describes the director primacy and team production 
models and explains why they are incompatible and false 
accounts of current reality. Part II shows the reality of CEO 
primacy and its costs, especially to shareholders. Part III offers a 
different and, it is submitted, more accurate description of how 
the market has shaped the current state of corporate governance. 
Part IV discusses trends that are weakening managerial 
domination and may lead to shareholder primacy and the social 
consequences of those trends. Part V concludes. 
broad community and constituent focus of the progressive governance model); see also 
infra notes 47, 53, 105-07, 348-51 and accompanying text. This Article will refer to the 
progressives' concept of the public interest without quotation marks, but it should be 
understood that the meaning of the term is controversial. See Kostant, supra, at 674-75 
(noting the lack of uniformity among progressive scholars and the distracting nature of 
labels). 
3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder 
Disempowerment, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1735, 1735 (2006) (defining the "director primacy" 
model). 
4. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A Stout, A Team Production Theory of 
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 253-54 (1999) (comparing the progressive model to 
that of the "team production" or "mediating" model); Kostant, supra note 2, at 667-68 
(calling the "team production model" a progressive idea). 
5. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520, 608 
(1990). 
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II. THE TEAM PRODUCTION AND DIRECTOR PRIMACY MODELS 
Under statutes in all states, business corporations are 
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors elected 
by their shareholders.6 Directors are fiduciaries of the 
shareholders and, i:ri theory, charged with promoting their 
interests.7 Proponents of the director primacy model (DPM) deny 
that directors are really chosen by the shareholders.8 Indeed, 
they claim that to serve shareholder interests, boards must be 
largely free of shareholder interference. 9 Advocates of the team 
production (or mediating) model (TPM) concur that directors are 
not chosen by shareholders. 10 However, they claim that boards do 
not act solely for the benefit of shareholders but balance the 
interests of various corporate constituencies and of the public; 
TPM advocates further claim that this is as it should be. 11 
A. The Director Primacy ·Madel 
1. The Efficient Market for Corporate Governance 
Hypothesis. According to the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
(ECMH), markets efficiently price securities at the present value 
of all expected future returns. 12 The relationship between 
shareholders and directors entails "agency costs" in the form of 
benefits (or "rents") appropriated by the directors as agents for 
the shareholders. 13 As a corollary of the ECMH, supporters of the 
DPM develop an "efficient market for corporate governance" 
hypothesis (EMCGH). The EMCGH posits that the agency costs 
of corporate governance are factored into stock prices. If agency 
6. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2001) ("The business and affairs of 
every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the 
direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter or in 
its certificate of incorporation."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (2001) ("[A]n annual 
meeting of stockholders shall be held for the election of directors."). 
7. See FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW, § 4.1.5, at 305 (2000) (setting 
forth that courts typically "say that directors owe their duty to the corporation and its 
shareholders"); see also Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 291 ("[C]orporate directors are a 
unique form of fiduciary .... "). 
8. See infra note 32 and accompanying text. 
9. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of 
Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 605 (2003) (addressing the superior role of 
the director in the director primacy model of corporate governance). 
10. See infra notes 40-39 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra Part LB. 
12. See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE 
FINANCE 347-70 (7th ed. 2003) (describing and documenting the ECMH). 
13. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-09 (1976). 
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costs were substantial, a corporation would be "more vulnerable 
to bankruptcy or hostile takeover."14 Further, "[b]y increasing the 
value of the firm, [managers] would do themselves a favor (most 
managers' compensation is linked to the stock market, and they 
own stock too)."15 Accordingly: "If investors truly believed greater 
shareholder control meant better corporate performance, they 
could 'vote with their wallets' by preferring shares in firms that 
give shareholders more control."16 Since they do not, "we may 
conclude investors do not value these rights."17 The status quo 
must be Nirvana for shareholders.18 
This reasoning has obvious flaws for companies that are 
already public. First, it ignores the serious and growing 
objections to the ECMH.19 Further, the alleged market 
constraints on managers are often feeble. The threats of 
bankruptcy and of hostile takeover do not eliminate rents, which 
for most firms are large, but only keep them low enough for the 
firm to avoid insolvency or a successful raid. 20 That agency costs 
reduce managers' compensation and the value of their shares is 
hardly a constraint at all. A self-interested manager will not 
desist from grabbing one dollar from the corporate till just 
because, as a shareholder, she owns a fraction (typically 
minuscule) of that dollar. If she owns one percent of the stock, 
one penny of each dollar she appropriates is her own; the other 
ninety-nine cents come from the pockets of other shareholders. 
Because of these weaknesses, EMCGH theorists rely heavily 
on initial public offerings (IP0s).21 Managers of IPO firms are 
major shareholders, so they suffer substantial loss if poor 
corporate governance reduces the IPO's share price. 22 Further, 
14. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736. 
15. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 205 (1991). 
16. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 
789, 802 (2007). Likewise, "if shareholder empowerment is as value-enhancing as 
[opponents to EMCGH) clain!D, why do we not already see it in the marketplace?" 
Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736. 
17. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1737. 
18. See Stout, supra note 16, at 803 (maintaining that shareholders themselves 
"prefer weak shareholder rights"). 
19. See infra Part III.A.3 (addressing the imperfect nature of information that 
influences market decisions). Michael Jensen himself has questioned the ECMH after 
concluding that mispricing of securities is common and can persist. Michael C. Jensen, 
Agency Costs of Overvalued Equity, 34 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6-7 (2005). 
20. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1736 (discussing how "[c)orporate managers 
therefore have strong incentives to offer investors attractive governance arrangements" to 
reduce its vulnerability to bankruptcy or hostile takeover). 
21. See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
22. See Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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most IPO firms have directors who represent major 
nonmanagement shareholders (like venture capitalists) who also 
suffer if the IPO price is suboptimal, so they also would demand 
that the firm adopt ideal corporate governance rules.23 
One problem with the EMCGH for both IPOs and companies 
already public is that the transaction costs of adopting optimal 
corporate governance rules and then explaining their value to 
investors are substantial. 24 Accordingly, EMCGH theorists also 
point that state corporate laws are off-the-rack sets of rules; 
corporate constituents need to negotiate their own governance 
rules only to the extent that state law dissatisfies them. Business 
executives, then, are motivated to incorporate in the state with 
the best corporate law. To attract corporate franchise fees states 
compete in a "race to the top" to offer the best corporate law. 25 
Nor is this competition limited to the fifty states. Bainbridge 
argues that if critics of the corporate governance status quo were 
right, "U.S. corporate governance would be largely dysfunctional. 
It is not."26 If some foreign corporate laws were more efficient 
than America's, capital would flow abroad. Foreign corporations 
would then enjoy a lower cost of capital than American 
companies, leading foreign firms and their nations to higher 
productivity and economic growth than America's. In other 
words, in addition to a domestic race to the top there is also an 
international race to the top. However, in economic growth and 
productivity gains, America has consistently exceeded other 
industrialized nations, 27 and America remains the most attractive 
locus for capital investment. We are winning the international 
race to the top, so our corporate governance laws must not be 
"dysfunctional." 
The EMCGH is tidy, appealing, and in some respects true, 
but the market for corporate governance is more complex and 
less efficient than EMCGH allows.28 Until recently, flaws in the 
1559, 1569 (2002) (noting that managers own a majority ofiPO firm shares). 
23. Id. 
24. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (discussing the high costs to 
investors of obtaining, processing, and benefiting from information). 
25. This thesis was first proposed in Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder 
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275-76 (1977). 
26. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739. 
27. Id. at 1739-40 (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of 
U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1 (European Corporate 
Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100). 
28. See Oren Bar-Gill et a!., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 134, 134 (2006) ("[C]ompetition among states ... produce[s] optimal 
rules with respect to issues that do not have a substantial effect on management's private 
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market for corporate governance persisted because there was no 
clearly superior model of corporate governance; now there is.29 
Moreover, international competition for capital is heating up. 
Other countries are gaining on us by improving their laws. 
Countries like China and India that once offered few investment 
opportunities have now joined this race. 30 Thus, inefficiencies in 
our corporate governance do not merely shave investors' profits a 
little; they now threaten America's appeal to investors and, 
accordingly, the health of our economy. 
2. Director Primacy as the Efficient Solution. An 
organization arises when a task cannot be done by one person or 
by several people interacting through contracts. Organizations 
delegate authority to agents. Citing the organizational theories of 
Kenneth Arrow, Steve Bainbridge says: 
Authority-based decisionmaking structures, which are 
characterized by a central agency empowered to make 
decisions binding on the firm as a whole, tend to arise when 
the firm's constituencies face information asymmetries and 
have differing interests. Because the corporation 
demonstrably satisfies those conditions, vesting the power 
of fiat in a central decisionmaker is the essential 
characteristic of its governance.31 
According to the DPM, a business with many owners must 
delegate not only day-to-day control but plenary authority to a 
largely self-perpetuating board of directors; the shareholder-
owners simply cannot inform themselves about the firm's 
operations and coordinate among themselves to control or even 
choose the board.32 They need directors to serve as "Platonic 
guardians. "33 
This theory defies rational economic behavior. Contracting 
parties do submit disputes to third parties; they must do so 
because the law permits litigation over contract disputes. 
However, shareholders do not surrender control of a business to 
someone with little stake in its success. To do that would violate 
benefits but not with respect to issues [such as takeover regulation] that have [an effect 
on management's private benefits]."). 
29. See infra note 353 and accompanying text. 
30. George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 39, 74 (2005). 
31. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1745 (citing KENNETH J. ARRow, THE LIMITS OF 
ORGANIZATION 68-69 (1974)). 
32. See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 558-59. 
33. Id. at 550-51. 
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an economic axiom-that an activity is usually handled most 
efficiently by those with the biggest stake in its success.34 
Bainbridge's argument for director primacy also contradicts his 
own defense of the EMCGH: if shareholders suffer from 
"information asym.metries"-they can't evaluate management 
decisions-how can capital markets be efficient, especially with 
respect to corporate governance rules? The solution to this dilemma 
is that his justification for director primacy is false. Principals 
(including shareholders) never have all the information or skills of 
expert agents (including business managers)-that's ·why experts 
are hired. But wise principals do not abandon all control, including 
power to fire the agent, leaving the agent to do as he wishes for 
whatever compensation he chooses. 
Likewise, the DPM is not necessitated by "differing interests" 
of "the firm's constituencies." Presumably, by "constituencies" 
Bainbridge means the shareholders because he himself says, 
[S]areholders are the only corporate constituency with a 
residual, unfixed, ex post claim on corporate assets and 
earnings .... [Therefore] shareholders have the strongest 
economic incentive to care about the size ofthe residual claim, 
which means that they have the greatest incentive to elect 
directors committed to maximizing firm profitability.35 
The statement clearly imports a unity of shareholder interest. 
Here, Bainbridge has it right. 36 
B. The Team Production (or Mediating) Model 
Advocates of the TPM agree with the DPM theory that boards 
operate largely free of shareholder control, but they claim that this 
autonomy benefits several corporate constituencies. 37 The TPM 
posits that firms need nonshareholder constituents (often called 
"stakeholders") to make commitments that would expose them to 
exploitation if shareholders controlled the firm. 38 Some stakeholders 
34. "[S]hareholders, as residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize 
the value of the firm." Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: 
Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 
CORNELL L. REv. 1266, 1267-68 (1999). As a result, "shareholders will place a higher 
value on being the beneficiaries of director fiduciary duties than will nonshareholder 
constituencies." STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOiviiCS 421 (2002). 
35. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 601, 613 (2006) 
36. See infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text. 
37. See Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 253. 
38. See Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on 
Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 
685-86 (2003); see also Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, Election Contests in the 
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(especially employees) are particularly vulnerable because, unlike 
shareholders, they cannot diversifY their investment of (human) 
capital or easily shift to another investment as individual 
shareholders can by selling their stock. To secure these 
commitments, firms must promise to treat stakeholders decently. 
However, because performance on each side is so complex and lasts 
indefinitely, the mutual commitments cannot be fully specified in 
contracts; shareholders could only promise to treat stakeholders 
"fairly." Since this commitment is too vague to be legally 
enforceable, the shareholders could easily renege; the stakeholders 
cannot trust them. 39 
To overcome this problem, shareholders cede control to 
disinterested directors who act as "mediating hierarchs" to balance 
the interests of shareholders and stakeholders.40 Indeed, 
shareholders tie their hands by agreeing to rules that make it 
difficult or impossible to replace directors.41 But, shareholders could 
still renege by selling the firm. 42 If this were easily done, 
stakeholders would not trust the firm and refuse to make the 
commitments it needs. Fortunately for shareholders, the law and 
firm-level antitakeover devices make it hard for them to sell the 
business. Thus, separation of ownership and control is the best of all 
possible worlds for investors; shareholders should welcome their 
weakness.43 The team production model makes corporations more 
profitable. 44 
Company's Proxy: An Idea Whose Time Has Not Come, 59 Bus. LAw. 67, 79 (2003) 
(alleging "the need to have a body that balances a wide array of competing interests, both 
among the shareholders themselves and between shareholders and other constituencies"). 
39. See Stout, supra note 16, at 805 (stating that investors may malm "opportunistic 
attempts to increase 'shareholder value' by changing the corporate rules in the middle of 
the game"). 
40. See id. at 797 ("Stakeholders contemplating making specific investments in 
relationships with corporations put more faith in firms run by boards than in firms run by 
powerful and possibly opportunistic shareholders."); see also Marleen A. O'Connor, The 
Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management 
Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899, 956 (1993) (proposing that directors be "neutral 
referees" for the various corporate constituencies). 
41. See Stout, supra note 38, at 686. The argument is bolstered by a claim that the 
corporation became the dominant form of business entity in the nineteenth century 
because it locked in capital. See Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate 
Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 
392-93 (2003); Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Governance: What History Can 
Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY. Bus. L.J. 1, 4--5 (2004). This claim is demolished by Larry E. 
Ribstein, Should History Lock In Lock-In?, 41 TULSA L. REV. 523, 524 (2006). 
42. See Stout, supra note 38, at 705. 
43. See Bainbridge, supra note 35, at 624 ("[S]hareholders will prefer to irrevocably 
delegate decisionmaldng authority to some smaller group, as, in the long run, this will 
maximize shareholder wealth."). 
44. See Kostant, supra note 2, at 671. Some commentators share the ideals of the 
TPM's fans but feel that corporations do not now adequately consider the interests of 
1222 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 
C. Problems of the Team Production and Director Primacy 
Models 
[44:5 
1. The Incompatibility of the Two Models and Their 
Internal Inconsistencies. The DPM and the TPM are 
incompatible: the DPM posits that the current corporate 
governance regime maximizes shareholder welfare; the TPM 
claims that it balances shareholder and stakeholder interests. 
Some contend that the two do not conflict because stakeholder 
and shareholder interests coincide.45 It is true that market 
forces compel firms to treat stakeholders well in order to 
maximize share price,46 but that does not mean the interests of 
the two groups are identical. 47 Employees, for example, benefit 
if they get all firm income above the costs of goods and outside 
services, leaving nothing for shareholders. In European 
companies with two-tiered boards, one of which includes 
employee representatives (called "co-determination"), the two 
groups often clash. 48 Two-tiered boards seem to reduce 
shareholder value. 49 Not surprisingly, then, Germany is now 
nonshareholder stakeholders; they would give these interests greater weight, but they do 
not all agree (or, for some writers, have any idea) how to achieve this goal. See Kent 
Greenfield, Saving the World With Corporate Law? 28 (Boston Col!. Law Legal Studies, 
Research Paper Series No. 130, 2007) available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=978242 ("The 
specifics [of implementation] do not matter as much as does the notion that the board 
itself should be a place where more than just a shareholder perspective will be heard."). 
45. See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, The Illusion of Law: The Legitimating Schemas 
of Modern Policy and Corporate Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1, 46-48 (2004); S. Ramakrishna 
Velamuri & S. Venkataraman, Why Stakeholder and Stockholder Theories Are Not 
Necessarily Contradictory: A Knightian Insight, 61 J. Bus. ETIDCS 249, 259 (2005) 
(positing that, "[i]n the absense of extensive legislation or detailed corporate codes of 
conduct," ethical values can bridge the gap between the normative stakeholder theory 
CTPM) and the investor centered model CDPM) when requiring a difficult decision such as 
the closing of a factory). 
46. See Michael Bradley et al., The Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation 
in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 9, 38 (1999) (postulating that "wealth-maximizing stakeholders at the time the 
firm is formed would agree that managers should run the firm so as to maximize the 
value of the firm's residual claim or common stock"). 
47. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 745 (2005) (doubting that the interests of the two groups always 
coincide). 
48. See Detlev F. Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the 
German, 80 HARV. L. REV. 23, 53 (1966) (stating that on such boards "members have 
special preoccupations and perspectives of their own"); see also Olubunmi Faleye et al., 
When Labor Has a Voice in Corporate Governance 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 11254, 2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11254 (finding 
that labor interests conflict with share value maximization). 
49. See Gary Gorton & Frank A. Schmid, Capital, Labor, and the Firm: A Study of 
German Codetermination, 2 J. EUR. ECON. AsS'N 863, 895 (2004) (concluding that firms 
that employ two-tiered boards trade at a significant discount compared to those which 
I 
l. 
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weakening co-determination.50 There is also evidence that 
increased "corporate social responsibility" reduces shareholder 
wealth. 51 
A variation on the compatibility theme is that the TPM and 
DPM differ only in their rhetoric about commitment to 
stakeholders.52 Again, though, shareholder primacy theory posits 
fair treatment of stakeholders so as to maximize share price, and it 
makes sense to publicize this fact. It is unclear, though, whether the 
claims about rhetoric are true---firms do not proclaim their 
shareholders' impotence to stakeholders. 
No evidence is offered that business behavior has changed, and 
corporate concern for the public interest does not seem to have 
grown. Indeed, increasing stakeholder rhetoric may "representD a 
temporary public relations response to the negative press generated 
by corporate scandals."53 Pay for most workers has stagnated.54 The 
environment and consumers seem no better served than before. 
Corporate manipulation of Congress and state legislatures with 
pots of money seems to have reached new heights (or, more 
accurately, depths). If there is any trend away from shareholder 
primacy, it is in favor of CEOs, not other stakeholders. 
have single-tiered boards). 
50. See Ehud Kamar, Beyond Competition for Incorporations, 94 GEO. L.J. 1725, 
1754 (2006) (referring to "the recent push in Germany to relax the so-called 
codetermination rights entitling employee representatives to half of the supervisory board 
seats in large companies"). 
51. See Leonardo Becchetti et al., Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Performance: Evidence from a Panel of U.S. Listed Companies 15 (Ctr. for Int'l Studies on 
Econ. Growth, Working Paper No. 78, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
abstract=871402 ("[Social responsibility] seems consistent with the shift in focus from 
wealth maximization to a multistakeholders welfare approach."). But see Lee E. Preston & 
Douglas P. O'Bannon, The Corporate Social-Financial Performance Relationship: A 
Typology and Analysis, 36 Bus. & Soc'y 419, 428 (1997) ("[E]mploying the largest 
longitudinal database used to date in this type of research, we find overwhelming 
evidence of a positive relationship between social and financial performance indicators in 
a sample of large and important U.S. corporations-a finding broadly consistent with the 
stakeholder theory of the corporation."). 
52. See Margaret M. Blair, Directors' Duties in a Post-Enron World: Why Language 
Matters, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 885, 899-900 (2003); Lisa M. Fairfax, The Rhetoric of 
Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate Norms, 31 J. CORP. L. 
675, 702 (2006). 
53. Fairfax, supra note 52, at 698 (declining also "to address the extent to which the 
rhetoric can, and likely will, have an impact on corporate conduct"); see also Brian Grow, 
The Debate over Doing Good, Bus. WK., Aug. 15, 2005, at 76-77 ("There's no doubt that a 
surge in co=unity outreach and do-good deeds is, in large part, a gussied-up bid for good 
favor."). 
54. DEAN BAKER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, THE PRODUCTIVITY GAP: 
WHAT THE DATA SHOW 3 (2007) ("The real hourly wage of a typical worker is only slightly 
higher in 2006 than it was in the seventies."), available at http://www.cepr.net/documents/ 
publications/growth_failure_04_2007.pdf. 
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If the TPM were important to stakeholders, we should 
observe a disadvantage of private companies that cannot deploy 
such rhetoric. No evidence of this is tendered. Quite the 
contrary, private ownership is surging.55 Indeed, the TPM's fans 
contradict themselves. They say "shareholders in close 
corporations are often tempted to use their managerial powers 
opportunistically."56 Yet, they also purport that in close 
corporations, "because there are fewer individuals involved, and 
these individuals often interact with each other, reputation and 
interpersonal trust can play a larger role in protecting against 
opportunism."57 
Another contradiction: It is said that "board governance 
offers important advantages in terms of efficient and informed 
decisionmaking."58 However, we also hear that "the existence of 
a mediating hierarchy may heighten incentives for team 
members to work out conflicts among themselves because the 
alternative is kicking the problem upstairs to a disinterested-
but potentially erratic or ill-informed-hierarch."59 Thus the 
board is depicted as both "efficient and informed" and as 
"erratic or ill-informed." 
The interests of various stakeholders conflict with each 
other as well as with those of the shareholders. There is not 
even an agreed definition of "stakeholders."60 Employees of a 
plant could clash with the plant's neighbors over whether to 
close the plant because of pollution it emits. Even employees, 
usually considered the primary stakeholder group, do not all 
have identical interests. Younger workers, for example, care 
more about a firm's longterm performance than do older 
employees.61 
55. See, e.g., Tom Lauricella, Mutual Funds Get Mad, WALL ST. J., Oct. 2, 2007, at 
R1 (noting the some fund managers' complaints about the upsurge of management 
buyouts). 
56. Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 302 (stating that this opportunism leads to the 
"exploit[ation of] their fellow shareholders"). However, no reason is stated why 
shareholders would not also exploit stakeholders. 
57. Stout, supra note 16, at 796 n.18. 
58. Id. at 792. 
59. Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 282. 
60. See R. Edward Freeman et al., Stakeholder Theory and "The Corporate Objective 
Revisited", 15 ORG. SCI. 364, 365 (2004) ("[S)takeholder theory can be many things to 
many people."); Ronald K Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder Identification 
and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 ACAD. MGMT. 
REV. 853, 858 (1997) (finding twenty-seven different definitions of "stakeholder"). 
61. Cf Sarah Pierce, Gen Y Myths Debunked, ENTREPENEUR.COM, June 1, 2007, 
http://www.entrepreneur.com/hurnanresources/managingemployees/articlel79200.html 
("[Younger) employees want to have a long-term relationship with a company .... "). 
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2. Dubious Premises. Many arguments for shareholder 
primacy use stock prices as evidence. 62 Displaying a curious 
ambivalence about stock market efficiency, DPJ\IIJTPM theorists 
often deny the significance of share price. First, they claim that 
market price does not reflect fundamental value. 63 This is 
ascribed partly to investors' irrationality; they are "often driven 
by emotion and cognitive bias."64 Similarly, they discount the 
event studies on which many arguments about corporate 
governance rely.65 This is puzzling because the same writers 
premise claims of investor contentment with the status quo in 
part on the efficiency of the stock market in valuing corporate 
governance and initial public offerings. 
Unfortunately, they seem to be wrong in every case. On one 
hand, the market is not very efficient in pricing corporate 
governance features, especially with regard to IPOs.66 In general, 
though, stock pricing is quite efficient. Although share prices do 
not exactly match fundamental value, no measure is better.67 
62. One example is the loss of share value caused by having a staggered board. See 
Lucian A Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Costs of Entrenched Boards, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 409, 
410-11 (2005) (discussing the negative correlation between the presence of staggered 
boards and firm value); Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REv. 887, 936-39 (2002) 
(contending that staggered boards provide the directors too much power to remain 
independent from the shareholders, resulting in negative target shareholder value after a 
hostile bid); Olubunrni Faleye, Classified Boards, Finn Value, and Managerial 
Entrenchment, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 501, 501 (2007) ("[C]lassified boards destroy value by 
entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness."); Michael D. Frakes, 
Classified Boards and Firm Value, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 113, 150-51 (2007) (recognizing 
negative effects of classified boards). Similarly, destaggering the board increases share 
price. See Faleye, supra, at 514; Mira Ganor, Why Do Managers Dismantle Staggered 
Boards? 40-43 (1st Annual Conference on Empirical Legal Studies Paper, 2006), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=908668. 
63. See Lynn A. Stout, Takeovers in the Ivory Tower: How Academics Are Learning 
Martin Lipton May Be Right, 60 Bus. LAw. 1435, · 1439-40 (2005) (claiming that the 
relationship between the two is "extremely loose"). 
64. ld. at 1443; see also HERSH SHEFRIN, BEYOND GREED AND FEAR: 
UNDERSTANDING BEHAVIORAL FINANCE AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INvESTING 3 (2004) 
("[T]he primary emotions that determine risk-taking behavior are not greed and fear, but 
hope and fear."); Jon E. Hilsenrath, As Two Economists Debate Markets, the Tide Shifts: 
Belief in Efficient Valuation Yields Ground to Role of Irrational Investors, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 18, 2004, at Al (comparing the irrationality of investors and the efficient market 
theory). 
65. See Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 656 (2003) (listing several criticisms of event 
studies). 
66. See infra notes 238-51 and accompanying text (discussing the high costs to 
investors of obtaining, processing, and benefiting from information); see also infra notes 
261-73 and accompanying text (discussing inefficiencies in the IPO market). 
67. 
The public's valuation of a company in the marketplace has unique value, 
because it is the only judgment that cannot be manipulated. Various notions of 
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Investors are human and therefore not always perfectly rational, 
but critics of share price do not show that this affects corporate 
governance. Investors have strong incentives to maximize 
fundamental value, and evidence indicates that on corporate 
governance issues shareholders do so act. 68 
If objections to share price were sound, how could we gauge 
the success of the mediating board? Its proponents offer no 
alternative.69 Without some yardstick, and without even loose 
accountability to any constituency, boards under the DPMITPM 
are, in effect, unconstrained. 70 Moreover, if directors should serve 
many constituencies and investors are irrational, why have 
shareholders elect boards at all? Would it not be better to neuter 
shareholders and make boards officially self-perpetuating? 
Likewise, if the DPMITPM is right that shareholders eschew 
control, they should not only be passive but also should oppose 
any activism by other shareholders. Assertiveness by some 
shareholders should be feared by others as a grab for special 
benefits. In fact, though, shareholder activism is growing, and 
value based on concepts like earnings per share, book value, rate of return on 
reinvested capital, and the like are based on accounting principles that are so 
highly flexible that they have limited significance. 
ROBERT A. G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE 55 (1995); see also Henry 
Manne, Remarks on the Lewis & Clark Law School Business Law Forum: Behavioral 
Analysis of Corporate Law: lnstntction or Distraction?, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 169, 
172, 175 (2006) ("[C]ritics like Professor Stout are simply claiming too much .... [M]ere 
'irrationality' on the part of some stock market participants cannot foil an otherwise 
efficient market."); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: 
The New Corporate Governance Paradigm 70-90 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 301, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100 (stating that stock prices 
have become more "informative" in recent years). 
68. See infra notes 116, 128--57 and accompanying text. 
69. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of 
Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 661 (2006) ("A major drawback to stakeholder 
theory is that it lacks a specific maximand to guide managerial discretion. To the extent 
that the interests of different stakeholders conflict, the stakeholder model offers no 
principled basis for choosing among them."); Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, 
Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 9 
(2001) (arguing that the lack of a corporate objective is likely to result in "confusion, 
conflict, [and] inefficiency"). See generally Anant K. Sundaram & Andrew C. Inkpen, The 
Corporate Objective Revisited, 15 ORG. SCI. 350, 350, 353-56 (2004) (arguing that 
shareholder value versus stakeholder value should be the preferred corporate objective). 
70. Berle recognized this situation as a consequence of separation of ownership and 
control. See Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 
HARv. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1932) ("The point is that [corporate managers] need recognize 
no other."); see also JOEL BAKAN, THE CORPORATION: TriE PATHOLOGICAL PURSUIT OF 
PROFIT AND POWER 34 (2004) (noting that if directors are responsible to several 
constituencies, they play them off against each other); Giovanni Cespa & Giacinta 
Cestone, Corporate Social Responsibility and Managerial Entrenchment, .16 J. ECON. & 
IVIGMT. STRATEGY 741, 743 (2007) ("CEOs who can rely on anti-takeover defenses and 
dominated boards do not need stakeholders' support to buttress their positions."). 
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even passive shareholders welcome the efforts of others.71 
Contrary to claims that investors tie their own hands, 
shareholder votes are significantly related to firm performance.72 
In sum, the DPMITPM never has accorded with reality and does 
so even less as time passes. 
DPMITPM scholars refuse to view shareholders as owners of 
the corporation for whom directors are agents: "the way corporate 
law actually works in practice is consistent with the notion that 
directors are independent hierarchs whose fiduciary obligations 
run to the corporate entity itself and only instrumentally to any 
of its participants.'m Directors are not agents because "they are 
not subject to direct control or supervision by anyone, including 
the firm's shareholders.''74 They are, instead, "a unique form of 
fiduciary who, to the extent they resemble any other form, 
perhaps most closely resemble trustees."75 Further, "American 
law ... grants directors tremendous discretion to sacrifice 
shareholders' interests in favor of management, employees, and 
creditors .... "76 Statutes in over half the states expressly allow 
boards to weigh nonshareholder interests. 77 
True, directors are not precisely agents of the shareholders, 
but the claim that they enjoy "tremendous discretion to sacrifice 
shareholders' interests in favor of' other stakeholders is grossly 
misleading. AS suggested by their own characterization of 
directors as resembling trustees for the shareholders, directors 
are fiduciaries of the shareholders and no one else. Most 
constituency statutes apply only to a takeover attempt, a rarity 
for any company and one most never face.78 And these laws are 
absent in nearly half the states, including Delaware, the 
ki . 79 ngpm. 
71. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text. 
72. See generally Jie Cai et al., Electing Directors 3, 13, 15 (May 2007) (working 
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=910548 (confirming the hypothesis that 
shareholder voting is related to firm performance); see also infra notes 287-90 and 
accompanying text. 
73. Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 289. 
74. ld. at 290. 
75. ld. at 291. 
76. ld. 
77. See id. at 303 n.l44 (stating that twenty-eight states allow directors to consider 
nonshareholder interests); Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical Framework 
for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 579 n.1, 587 n.33 
(1992) (listing statutes). 
78. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 717(b) (McKinney 2003) (outlining New York's 
constituency statute). 
79. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency 
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 27-28 (1992) (noting that although twenty-nine 
states have constituency statutes, Delaware is not among them). 
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True also, the legal devices by which shareholders can call 
the board to account-specifically election and removal of 
directors and derivative suit-are imperfect, especially when the 
directors' acts are not self-interested.80 In legal doctrine, however, 
directors are fiduciaries of the shareholders only. 81 Occasionally, 
directors are held to have breached their duties without any 
conflict of interest. 82 More important, the law often proclaims 
shareholder primacy. A key purpose of the Securities Exchange 
Act was to realize shareholder democracy. 83 Delaware courts 
recognize that the shareholder franchise is the linchpin of 
corporate legitimacy.84 
The looseness of the directors' duties and restrictions on 
derivative suits are defended on the theory that tighter 
standards would breed excessive caution in directors fearful of 
personal liability and deter the best candidates from serving on 
boards. This reasoning is pure speculation, though; there is no 
evidence of its truth, and experience seems to show that an 
insistence on minimal care and competence does not empty a 
field of qualified practitioners. 
It is true that not every step taken to increase shareholder 
power has produced benefits. That only shows, however, that the 
best means of implementing shareholder primacy are still 
unclear. Many enhancements of shareholder influence do 
generate gains. 85 Shareholder democracy is a work in progress. 
The Declaration of Independence proclaimed that governments 
"deriv[e] their just powers from the consent of the governed."86 
80. See Blair & Stout, supra note 4, at 292-315 (analyzing derivative suits and 
voting rights under the "mediating hierarchy model" and determining that such 
shareholder powers are "so weak as to be virtually meaningless"). 
81. E.g., Newby v. Enron Corp., 188 F. Supp. 2d 684, 704 & n. 10 (S.D. Tex. 2002) 
(noting the fiduciary duty owed to shareholders by directors). 
82. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176 
(Del. 1986) (forbidding the board to weigh nonshareholder interests in a takeover bid 
except to benefit shareholders); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874 (Del. 1985) 
(holding board liable for breach of the duty of care when it accepted a takeover bid); Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N. W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (forbidding the board to withhold 
dividends and devote corporate funds to the public interest). 
83. "Fair corporate suffrage is an important right that should attach to every equity 
security .... " H.R. REP. NO. 73-1383, at 13 (1934). The goal was to prevent "the 
recurrence of abuses which have frustrated the free exercise of the voting rights of 
stockholders." Id. at 14, quoted in Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970), 
and J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964); see also S. REP. No. 73-1455, at 73-
77 (1934) (observing the importance of stockholder knowledge in relation to proxy voting). 
84. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659 (Del. Ch. 1988) (''The 
shareholder franchise is the ideological underpinning upon which the legitimacy of 
directorial power rests."). 
85. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text. 
86. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
t 
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Yet, it took over 100 years before women obtained the right to 
vote and nearly 200 years before African-Americans were really 
able to vote in many states.87 Shareholder democracy has not 
been realized, but it is widely recognized as the holy grail of 
corporate governance, and changes in the law and in actual 
corporate behavior are bringing us closer to that ideal.88 
3. The Team Production Model Does Not Benefit 
Stakeholders. A board of "mediating hierarchs" is not necessary 
to win stakeholder loyalty. To induce employees or suppliers to 
make firm-specific investments, the firm can pay their out-of-
pocket costs89 or offer rewards for making the investments.90 
Employees care not only about material rewards, but also (maybe 
even more) about procedural fairness. 91 But a mediating board is 
not needed to achieve this; investors seeking maximum share 
value have an incentive to maximize the efficiency of employees 
and to provide fair procedures that promote it.92 
Some claim that the TPM prevents takeovers by an acquirer 
who will fire employees or curtail their pay or perquisites. 
However, most acquirers do not cut employment or 
compensation.93 That is not surprising-an acquirer striving to 
maximize share value has as much incentive as any equity owner 
to treat employees well. Indeed, better management or synergies 
87. U.S. CONST. amend. XN. See generally McKen Carrington, Book Review, 26 T. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 107, 110 n.11 (2000) (reviewing MERLINE PITRE, IN STRUGGLE AGAINST 
JIM CROW: LULU WHITE AND THE NAACP 1900-1957 (1998)). 
88. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text. 
89. See Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. 
POL. ECON. 9, 18 (1962) (discussing the costs and benefits of specific investments in 
employees); Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 
31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 548-49 (2006). 
90. See Lee, supra note 89, at 549 (mentioning profit-sharing formulas and 
performance standards as possible inducements). 
91. See Kent Greenfield, Using Behavioral Economics to Show the Power and 
Efficiency of Corporate Law as Regulatory Tool, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 581, 615-16 (2002) 
(discussing findings of behavioral psychologist Tom Tyler). Significantly, Tyler does not 
say that employees care about the composition of the board; tlley care about how they are 
treated, not who makes the decisions. 
92. See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional 
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 811, 863 (1992) ("In tile long run, shareholders can't 
systematically exploit other 'stakeholders' in the corporate enterprise" because doing so 
would damage the shareholders' own interests.). See generally Olubunmi Faleye & Emery 
Trahan, Is What's Best for Employees Best for Shareholders. 7, 13, 24 (May 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=888180 ("It appears that 
the benefits of creating an employee-friendly environment significantly outweigh the costs 
and that what is best for employees is, at least, good for shareholders."). 
93. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, ANNUAL REPORT ON 
MAss LAYOFFS IN 1988, at 2 (1989) (finding that fewer than 5% of major layoffs resulted 
from changes in firm ownership). 
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stemming from a merger often benefit the acquired firm's 
employees.94 Thus, when management thwarts a takeover, it is as 
likely to be hurting other employees as helping them. On the 
other side, managers of the acquired company often receive side 
payments in mergers.95 
A mediating board is not just unnecessary to protect 
stakeholders but is also a dubious way to do it. There is no 
reason to think that independent directors care about 
stakeholders more than shareholders do. 96 Entrenched 
managers may pay their employees more,97 but the excessive 
compensation of autocratic executives alienates workers.98 
Consider also Enron, WorldCom, and Tyco, whose boards slept 
while mismanagement destroyed their companies.99 The losses 
suffered by shareholders were huge, but few had their lives 
destroyed as did many employees. These boards were not 
unusually insensible; they were quite typical. 100 Directors often 
play along with auctions of financially troubled companies that 
favor insiders to the detriment of creditors. 101 "Mediating" 
94. Charles Brown & James L. Medoff, The Impact of Firm Acquisitions on Labor, 
in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 9, 11, 23 (Alan J. Auerbach, ed., 
1988) ("In general, we find small (and sometimes positive) changes in wages and 
employment following an acquisition.") 
95. See GEVURTZ supra note 7, § 7.1.1(c), at 637. 
96. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access to the Ballot, 59 
Bus. LAw. 43, 59 (2003) ("The interests of directors and executives are even less aligned 
with the interest of stakeholders than they are aligned with the interests of 
shareholders .... [T]here is no reason to expect that reduced accountability to 
shareholders would translate into increased attention to stakeholders."). 
97. See Henrik Cronqvist et al., Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More? 
12, 24 (Fisher Call. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2007-03-010, 2007), available at 
http://ssrn/com/abstract= 845844 (reporting the results of an empirical study). 
98. See James D. Cox, Fair Play for Chief Executive Officers, in LAW AND CLASS IN 
AMERICA: TRENDS SINCE THE COLD WAR 99, 114 (P.D. Carrington & T. Jones eds., 2006); 
see also infra note 198 and accompanying text. 
99. See DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM 163-65, 183-84 (2005) (describing 
the inaction of the directors as their companies collapsed). 
100. See PATRICK A. REARDON, HARD LESSONS FOR MANAGEMENT, DIRECTORS AND 
PROFESSIONALS 71-72 (2003) (extolling the qualifications of Enron's Audit and 
Compliance Committee members); William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of 
Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 1333-34 (2002) (stating that Enron's board 
followed widely accepted "good governance practice"); Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron 
Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some Initial 
Reactions, 69 U. Cm. L. REV. 1233, 1241 (2002) (noting how Enron had "a splendid board 
on paper"); Troy A. Paredes, Enron: The Board, Corporate Governance, and Some 
Thoughts on the Role of Congress, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR 
IMPLICATIONS 495, 504--05 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004) ("(T]he 
Enron board was on the scene and, for the most part, taking most of the steps we ask a 
board to take."). 
101. See Gretchen Morgenson, 'For Sale' May Mean 'You Lose,' N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 
2007, § 3, at 1; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 
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directors are less watchdogs for stakeholders than lapdogs for 
management. 
If reassurance of stakeholders is a real problem, a contract 
seems a better solution than the "mediating" board. A promise of 
decent treatment cannot be fully specified, but many 
commitments can be spelled out, as they are in collective 
bargaining agreements. When this method of protection is 
impractical, it may be wise to vest discretion in a third party, but 
a traditional arbitrator or mediator seems better for this than the 
modern board. These arrangements are common not only in labor 
agreements but also in all kinds of relational contracts. 102 Their 
frequent use suggests that a need to reassure stakeholders is not 
the reason for shareholder impotence. 
The TPM is also alleged to improve corporate compliance 
with law and social responsibility.103 Unaffiliated directors are 
supposedly less likely to break the law since they will not profit 
from illegal acts. 104 However, champions of the TPM offer no 
evidence that nonpublic, shareholder-controlled companies are 
less law-abiding than director primacy companies. 
As for other aspects of "social responsibility," a glaring 
difficulty is that the concept is hopelessly vague. Beyond obeying 
the law, how should a board balance such competing concerns as 
the environment, philanthropy, employees, and consumers? In a 
democracy, pursuit of goals outside the market with other 
people's money is supposed to be handled by elected officials. 
Directors eschewing profit maximization do not pursue the same 
goals Americans would choose democratically. Now, most boards 
are dominated by the CEO, so corporate philanthropy favors the 
pet charities of CEOs. 105 Corporate gifts come from the pockets of 
106 MICH. L. REv. 1, 32-34 (2007) (discussing possible explanations for below-market 
sales, including personal incentives to company insiders like CEOs). 
102. See, e.g., George Dent, Lawyers and Trust in Business Alliances, 58 Bus. LAW. 
45, 74-75 (2002) (describing the use of arbitration and mediation in strategic business 
alliances). 
103. See Kostant, supra note 2, at 684-703. 
104. Peter Kostant claims that mediating directors are more likely to obey the law 
because they are less dominated by the CEO. See id. at 684, 688. It is not clear to what he 
is comparing the TPM. However, he admits that the TPM is "a dubious model" if this 
assumption is not true. Id. at 684. In fact, it is not true. See infra note 347 and 
accompanying text. 
105. See W.O. Brown et. al., Corporate Philanthropic Practices, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 855, 
855-57 (2006); J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: "Independent" Directors 
and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 72, 78 (2006-07) [hereinafter 
Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits]; Henry N. Butler & Fred S. McChesney, Why They 
Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate Philanthropy in the Contractual 
Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1195, 1205 (1999); Faith Stevelman Kahn, 
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 
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taxpayers as well as shareholders because gifts are tax 
deductible and reduce corporate taxes. 
When America wants corporations to pursue goals other 
than profit, it can pass laws (environmental laws, for example) 
dictating such goals or raise corporate taxes. The problem for 
progressives is that American democracy rejects their program. 
They hope the TPM will sneak that program in through the back 
door. 106 It is ironic that progressives despair of democracy and yet 
favor unelected, unaccountable elite. It is also a false hope to 
grant social power to CEO-dominated boards with, as Adolf Berle 
put it, no more than a "pious wish" that something good will 
come of it.107 Reducing incentives for efficiency will not advance 
the progressive goals. 
Most directors now have little personal stake in firm 
performance, but shareholders have a keen incentive to 
maximize profits and share price. In a market economy, the 
"invisible hand" guides those seeking personal profit also to 
benefit others108 in many ways, including better jobs, better 
quality and price of goods and services, and higher tax receipts. 
At least when the firm is solvent, "profit maximization benefits 
all participants in the corporate venture and promotes societal 
welfare."109 Much of the innovation and employment growth m 
America comes from nonpublic companies.110 The efficiency of 
shareholder primacy helps explain this phenomenon. 
UCLA L. REV. 579, 591 (1997) (claiming that "in most public corporations senior executive 
officers still exert extraordinary influence over ... the selection of beneficiary 
organizations"). 
106. See Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 
1259, 1271 (1982) (stating that progressives seek to change corporate governance laws 
because they have "largely failed in implementing their objectives through the political 
processes"); Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine-The Social Responsibility of 
Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6, at 33. 
107. Berle, supra note 70, at 1368. 
108. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 485 (Modern Library 2000) (1776) 
(the individual "intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by 
an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention"); Jeffrey G. 
Mcintosh, The End of Corporate Existence: Should Boards Act as Mediating Hierarchs? A 
Comment on Yalden, in THE CORPORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 37, 72 (Anita I. Anand & 
William F. Flanagan eds., 2003) (stating that following the mediating model would reduce 
innovation and risk-taking); Sundaram & Inkpen, supra note 69, at 353 ("Only residual 
cash flow claimants have the incentive to maximize the total value of the firm."). 
109. Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty Upon Corporate Insolvency: Proper Scope of 
Directors' Duty to Creditors, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1497 (1993). 
110. "[S]mall businesses generate 60 to 80 percent of the net new jobs added each 
year, employ half of all private sector employees, and pay 44.3 percent of the total U.S. 
private payroll." DEMOCRATIC STAFF, H. COMl'II. ON SMALL BUSINESS, 108TH CONG., SMALL 
BUSINESS RECORD REPORT 1 (2004), available at http://www.house.gov/smbiz/democrats 
/2004yearendreport%20docFIN AL. pdf. 
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In a global economy with mobile capital, profit 
maximization is desirable not only for these benefits of the 
"invisible hand" but also because it draws capital investment to 
the nation. The importance of this draw is evidenced by the 
faster economic growth in America than in other countries.111 
However, many countries are now making themselves more 
attractive to investors; the United States cannot smugly assume 
continued superiority.112 
In Conan Doyle's story, Silver Blaze, Sherlock Holmes 
solves a crime in part by noting the dog that didn't bark.113 If the 
TPM were valid, stakeholders would be treated better by public 
firms hewing to that model than by private firms with 
shareholder-chosen boards. Likewise, employees would suffer 
when a public company goes private in a leveraged buyout. 
Employees, then, should flee such companies. No evidence of 
this is offered. Nor is there evidence that private firms are less 
solicitous of customers, suppliers, the environment, or the 
communities in which they operate. Like the dog that didn't 
bark, this absence is telling; it belies the TPM. 
4. The Laclr, of Intra-Shareholder Conflicts and Investor 
Myopia. Some claim that an autonomous board is needed to 
mediate conflicts not only between shareholders and other 
constituents but also among the shareholders themselves. 114 The 
concern is grossly exaggerated. Investors do vary in many 
111. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739-40 ("U.S. productivity gains in the past 
decade have been exceptional, and the U.S. stock market has consistently outperformed 
other world indices over the last two decades." (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. 
Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1 
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441100)). 
112. See infra notes 342-45 and accompanying text. 
113. When Holmes refers to "the curious incident of the dog in the night-time," 
Inspector Gregory says, "The dog did nothing in the night-time." Holmes replies: "That 
was the curious incident." ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in 1 THE COMPLETE 
SHERLOCK HOLMES§ 1, at 1, 23 (Doubleday, Doran & Co. 1930) (1893). 
114. See !man Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 
UCLA L. REV. 561, 577-93 (2006) (claiming various conflicts of interests among 
shareholders); Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1751, 1754-57 (alleging danger of special 
interest shareholders); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and 
Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 347, 368-70 (1991) (noting 
shareholder differences over time horizons, risk preferences, and expectations for the 
future); Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 38, at 78 ("[M]any institutional investors and 
other activist investors have competing interests that may conflict with the best interests 
of the public corporation and its shareholder body and other constituencies talmn as a 
whole."); Stout, supra note 16, at 794 ("Board power ... protect[s] shareholders from each 
other."); see also Stout, supra note 63, at 1447-49 (claiming that highly diversified 
shareholders may oppose share-price maximization in some firms because of their 
interests in others). 
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ways, 115 but nearly all shareholders want to maximize firm 
value. 116 
More specifically, some allege that large shareholders extract 
special benefits-or would do so under a regime of shareholder 
primacy. 117 However, a large shareholder has financial incentives to 
monitor firm performance and· to work to optimize it, and 
institutional investors have the sophistication to perform these 
functions. 118 Any large shareholder that sought special benefits 
would be checked by other large shareholders.119 Again, Silver Blaze 
is instructive. 120 If shareholders were as divided as public voters, 
shareholder meetings would be as contentious as political elections 
and corporations (like political, religious, and civic organizations) 
would pursue varying goals. Major institutional shareholders and 
115. See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 69, at 661 ("(I]nvestors vary considerably among such 
dimensions as the time frame over which they invest, the extent to which they trade 
versus passively holding the corporation's stock, their degree of diversification, the extent 
to which they hold non-equity interests in the issuer, any option or other hedging 
positions that they hold, and so forth."). 
116. "Although a wide range of precatory resolutions are put forward [for 
shareholder vote], the ones that obtain majority support are those ... that are widely 
viewed by financial institutions as serving shareholder interests." Lucian A. Bebchuk, 
Reply: Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784, 1799 (2006); see also 
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 469 n.16 ("Although investors have somewhat different 
preferences on issues such as dividends and the like, they are generally united by a desire 
to maximize share value."); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of 
Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 466 (1991) (stating that "the 
potential for conflict between large and small shareholders will likely be minimal"). Some 
diversified shareholders may care less how an act by a firm in which they are invested 
will affect itself than how it will affect another firm in which they are invested, but the 
overall impact of such concems is small. See Jarrad Harford et al., Conflicts of Interests 
Among Shareholders: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions 1, 4-5 (MIT Sloan Sch. of 
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 4653-07, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1000421 
(discussing cares and concerns of "shareholder cross-holdings"). Existence of even a small 
impact is rather speculative. Direct evidence of shareholders opposing value-maximizing 
acts in a firm because of their interests in other firms is extremely rare. 
117. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Comment on the SEC Shareholder Access 
Proposal 12-13 (UCLA School of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 03-22, 2003), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=470121 ("[I]nstitutional 
investors may abuse their control by self-dealing and other forms of over-reaching .... If 
the board becomes more beholden to the interests of large shareholders, it may become 
less concerned with the welfare of smaller investors."). 
118. See Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM. 
L. REV. 10, 14 (1991) ("If an owner could take 25% stock positions in a few firms, it might 
find it worthwhile to assemble a staff with expertise to monitor effectively."); see also 
Laura L. Frieder & Avanidhar Subrahmanyam, Executive Compensation and Investor 
Clientele 5 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.corn/ 
abstract=937115 (stating that empirical tests show that indirect executive compensation 
is lower in companies with more large investors). 
119. See MARKJ. ROE, STRONG lVIANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 244-45 (1994) (stating that multiple intermediaries can 
form "countercoalition[s]"). 
120. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
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shareholder advisory services would be addressing the issue and the 
business press would be discussing it. In fact there is no evidence 
for any ofthis.121 
Shareholders' behavior confirms their common purpose. In this 
way they resemble baseball fans. Fans have varied political, 
religious, and social attitudes, but at a game they table their 
differences and unite to root for their team. They often display great 
camaraderie with people with whom they otherwise have little in 
common. Among shareholders, even hedge funds, which are 
sometimes portrayed as threats to other investors/22 are actually 
welcomed.123 If institution of real shareholder primacy did expose 
particular conflicts of interest, these could be handled by narrowly 
focused rules rather than by scrapping shareholder primacy 
altogether. 124 
Some charge that shareholders, including institutional 
investors, focus unduly on short-term results. 125 This obsession with 
121. See, e.g., Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1043 (1996) 
("[S]hareholders do not have the kinds of disputes one would expect if they were a diverse 
group of Americans engaged in a struggle to make corporations in their images .... "). 
Most shareholder disputes that do occur are initiated by special interest shareholders 
whose motions are overwhelmingly rejected. See supra note 116 (quoting Lucian Bebchuk 
on shareholder voting). 
122. See Andrew M. Kulpa & Butzel Long, The Wolf in Shareholder's Clothing: 
Hedge Fund Use of Cooperative Game Theory and Voting Structures to Exploit Corporate 
Control and Governance, 6 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 4, 4 (2005); Memorandum from Martin 
Lipton et al. to Clients, Be Prepared for Attacks by Hedge Funds (Dec. 21, 2005), 
available at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/wlrk122205-02.pdf. 
123. See Chris Young, Hedge Funds to the Rescue, Bus. WK., July 31, 2006, at 86 
(stating that hedge funds have become "the catalyst" for proxy fights, leading 
shareholders in opposing value-impairing deals); Alon Brav et al., Hedge Fund Activism, 
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance 1 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., 
Finance Working Paper No. 139/2006, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948907 
("The market reacts favorably to hedge fund activism, as the abnormal return upon 
announcement of potential activism is in the range of 5-7 percent, with no apparent 
reversal in the subsequent year."); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in 
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control 53 (Univ. of Pa. Inst. for Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 06-16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=919881 (stating 
that traditional institutions are happy to "tag along'' with activist hedge funds). Further, 
"target firms see moderate improvement in operational performance and considerably 
higher CEO turnover after activism." Brav, supra, at 1. 
124. For example, some board seats are held by banks that are major lenders to the 
company and that also control the voting of many company shares through their trust 
departments. See Joao A.C. Santos & Adrienne S. Rumble, The American Keiretsu and 
Universal Banks: Investing, Voting and Sitting on Nonfinancials' Corporate Boards, 80 J. 
FIN. ECON. 419, 436 (2006) (discussing banks' ability to vote stock held in trust). If these 
banks are shown to misuse their board seats, they could be barred from boards. 
125. See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note 38, at 78 (stating that some investors "may 
seek to push the corporation into steps designed to create a short-term pop in the 
company's share price"); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A 
Traditionalist Response to Bebchuk's Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119 
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short-term results creates a conflict between current shareholders, 
who profit from "earnings manipulation," and future 
shareholders.126 Director primacy, then, insulates managers from 
"short-termism," freeing them to build long-term value. 
The charge of short-termism raises four questions. First, is it 
true? "[F]or all the anecdotal evidence of short-termism and its 
effects, there is not a lot of empirical data to back it up."127 "[N]o one 
has demonstrated that the long/short phenomenon exists."128 
Although some institutions do turn over their portfolios rapidly, 
there is no theoretical reason or empirical evidence that this makes 
their attitudes on corporate strategy any different from those of 
long-term shareholders.129 No evidence is offered that profitable 
long-term business opportunities go begging, as should happen if 
myopia were rampant. The accusations first surfaced during the 
1970s and early 1980s when America's economy was stagnant and 
Japan, Germany, and other countries seemed to be performing 
better.130 However, for some years now America has outpaced its 
economic rivals, so the whole claim seems dubious.131 
Second, if there is a problem, does it stem from defective 
corporate governance? Some charge that American companies pass 
up business opportunities promising returns that foreign firms 
accept. The reason, however, may be that the cost of capital is 
HARV. L. REV. 1759, 1764 (2006). 
126. See Patrick Bolton et al., Pay for Short-Term Performance: Executive 
Compensation in Speculative Markets, 30 J. CORP. L. 721, 725 (2005). 
127. Joe Nocera, A Defense of Short-Termism, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2006, at Cl. 
"Baruch Lev, the well-known accounting professor at New York University ... scoffs at 
the notion that short-termism is even a problem." Id. Iman Anabtawi points to efforts of 
hedge-fund managers to have MCI, Inc. sold to Qwest Communications, the highest 
bidder, rather than to merge with Verizon Communications, which the board believed 
"offered MCI shareholders better long-term synergies." Anabtawi, supra note 114, at 582-
83. However, Anabtawi offers no evidence that the board was right and the hedge funds 
wrong. 
128. Roe, supra note 118, at 13. 
129. "If a governance provision does not serve long-term shareholder value, its 
adoption will likely reduce short-term prices (which reflect expectations about long-term 
value) ... ." Bebchuk, supra note 116, at 1802; see also Bernard Black & Reinier 
Kraakrnan, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value, 96 Nw. U. 
L. REV. 521, 532 (2002) ("Under elementary principles of finance, even short-term 
investors have an incentive to maximize the firm's long-term value .... ");Roe, supra note 
118, at 13 ("The long/short controversy posits a market failure. After all, institutions 
should know how to discount long-term value to present value."). 
130. See MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR 
BUSINESS MYOPIA 1-4 (1991) (discussing the United States's declining competitiveness in 
the 1970s and 1980s compared to Japan and Germany). 
131. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1739-40 (quoting Bengt Holmstrom & Steven 
N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong? 1 
(European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 23/2003, 2003), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm ?abstract_id=441100. 
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higher for American firms (which is not necessarily bad). 132 If so, the 
causes may lie outside corporate governance, such as government 
tax fuJ.d fiscal policies and Americans' propensity to spend much and 
save little.133 
Third, if short-termism exists and stems at least partly from 
defective corporate governance, is the defect pressure from short-
term shareholders? Despite charges by CEOs of shareholder 
obsession with quarterly earnings, high institutional ownership 
is not associated with lower research and development (R&D) 
investment.134 Share prices rise when companies increase 
R&D. 135 Share prices do not react positively to accounting 
changes that increase reported earnings but not cash flow. 136 
Price to earnings ratios vary widely; obviously, investors consider 
factors other than current earnings. This is also evident from the 
successful public offerings by firms with little or no history of 
profits. Strong shareholder rights are associated with higher 
share, bond, and asset values, higher levels of investment, and 
higher firm valuation. 137 Even the Business Roundtable seems to 
concede excessive shareholder power does not cause corporate 
• 138 
myopia. 
132. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 11 (alleging a "higher cost of capital in the 
United States" which "explain[s] a lot about short-term business behavior"). Cheap capital 
is generally desirable; it allows more investment, which creates more jobs and wealth. 
However, in countries with weak shareholder rights, returns on investment may be less 
than the cost of capital. See Klaus Gugler et al., Corporate Governance and the Returns on 
Investment, 47 J.L. & ECON. 589, 591-92 (2004). In that case, too much investment may 
be detrinlental to investors. That would be troubling in a country like America where 
investment in securities is widespread and an important source of income for a growing 
number of retirees. See Patricia E. Dilley, Hope We Die Before We Get Old: The Attack on 
Retirement, 12 ELDER L.J. 245, 270-75 (2004) (discussing the dangers of retirees' 
increasing reliance on stock investments). 
133. But see JACOBS, supra note 130, at 14 (arguing that these causes have negligible 
impact on costs of capital face by competing firms in the same market). 
134. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, INSTITUTIONAL 
OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INvESTMENTS (1985). 
135. See Randall Woolridge, Competitive Decline and Corporate Restructuring: Is a 
Myopic Stock Market to Blame?, 1 J. APPLIED. CORP. FIN. 26, 26-36 (1988). See generally 
John J. McConnell & Chris J. Muscarella, Corporate Capital Expenditure Decisions and 
the Market Value of the Firm, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 399, 415 (1985) (comparing the effect of 
budget increases and decreases in several areas, including research and development). 
136. See Robert S. Kaplan & Richard Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting 
Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 45 J. Bus. 225, 245 (1972) (finding accounting 
changes to have no statistically significant effect upon share prices and concluding, 
"Earnings manipulation may be fun, but its profitability is doubtful"). 
137. See infra notes 282-86 and accompanying text. 
138. DAN KREHMEYER ET AL., CFA CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY & Bus. 
ROUNDTABLE INST. FOR CORPORATE ETHICS, BREAKING THE SHORT-TERM CYCLE: 
DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON HOW CORPORATE LEADERS, AsSET MANAGERS, 
INVESTORS, AND ANALYSTS CAN REFOCUS ON LONG-TERM VALUE 2 (2006), available at 
http://www.cfapubs.org/doilpd:f/10.2469/ccb.v2006.nl.4194 (recommending several 
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If myopia is the problem, powerful executives rather than 
shareholders may be its source. Insulation from shareholder 
pressure does not seem to produce the long-term focus that the 
short-term theory would predict. Companies that adopt takeover 
defenses actually reduce R&D.139 "[L]ess monitoring by owners 
makes managers invest less rather than more in order to enjoy the 
quiet life."140 The higher cost of capital to American companies may 
stem in part from an aversion of .American executives to debt, which 
. h th 't 141 IS c eaper an eqm y. 
Equity may be more costly in the United States partly because 
of the separation of ownership and control. "Sometimes [myopic 
behavior] occurs when managers hold little stock in their companies 
and are compensated in ways that motivate them to take actions to 
increase accounting earnings rather than the value of the firm."142 
Small ownership is typical: "The average CEO of a Fortune 500 
company owns about one-fourth of [one] percent of his company's 
stock."143 A CEO may inflate the firm's stock price by false 
disclosures and then dump his own shares before the truth 
emerges. 144 This is but one of many forms of self-serving behavior by 
CEOs.145 Thus, some label CEOs' claims of managing for the long 
term ''bogus."146 
The fourth question: If short-term shareholders are indeed 
a problem, is director primacy the solution? If shareholders are 
changes, including aligning executive compensation with long-term goals and ending the 
practice of issuing quarterly earnings guidance, none of which would weaken shareholder 
influence). 
139. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 249 n.4 (citing a study by the SEC's Office of 
Economic Analysis). 
140. See 0yvind B!ilhren et al., Corporate Governance and Real Investment Decisions 
3 (2007) (unpublished EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=891060 (citing their own empirical findings and Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil 
Mullainathan, Enjoying the Quiet Life? Corporate Governance and Managerial 
Preferences, 111 J. POL. ECON. 1043, 1047 (2003)). 
141. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 192 ("Contrary to popular belief, American 
companies are actually underleveraged by international standards."). 
142. Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and Evidence, in 
KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGET: THE lJ';lPACT OF THE HOSTILE T~OVER 314, 320 (John 
C. Coffee, Jr., Louis Lowenstein, Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988); see also JACOBS, 
supra note 130, at 194--96. 
143. JACOBS, supra note 130, at 64. 
144. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. 
145. See generally infra notes 183-207 and accompanying text (discussing the 
detriments of CEO domination). 
146. Nocera, supra note 127; see also MATTEO TONELLO, REVISITING STOCK MARKET 
SHORT-TERMISM 8 (2006) (reporting that "most business managers stated that they would 
rather forgo an investment promising a positive return on capital than miss the quarterly 
earnings expectations of their analysts and financiers"); John R. Graham et al., The 
Economic Implications of Corporate Financial Reporting 17 (Nat'! Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 10550, 2004). 
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obsessed with the short term, it may be because they lack 
information about and control over the long term. 147 Director 
primacy may be more a cause of than a cure for short-termism. 
Shareholder power may actually counter managerial myopia. 148 
As for conflicting interests among shareholders, even 
assuming that holders of a small fraction of a firm's stock 
could profit from manipulating reported earnings and then 
dumping their stock at an inflated price, this course of action 
could not work for holders of large blocks. 149 
Some commentators have trumpeted one horror story. 150 
The proposed acquisition of King Pharmaceuticals by Mylan 
Laboratories was opposed by a shareholder who had voting 
rights in many shares of Mylan but had hedged away all 
economic interest in those shares and held a big equity stake 
in King. 151 The specter conjured is that "pure" shareholders 
would be outvoted by investors with a conflicting interest. 
However, such ploys are rare152 and likely to remain so because 
the amount of stock available for such gambits is limited. 153 
More important, because a borrower of shares "must pay a 
'rebate"' to the lender, the lenders know the risks of lending 
and charge for them. 154 In short, "stock lending is, to an 
important degree, self-policing."155 Voting rules for a few ploys 
like short sales and record date capture trades may need to be 
147. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 10 ("Lack of communication prevents investors 
from understanding management's long-term goals and objectives."); id. at 36 ("The 
problem lies in the quality of information the market uses to value companies, not in the 
greediness or impatience of investors."). 
148. See Alex Edmans, Blockholders, Market Efficiency, and Managerial Myopia 29 
(Mar. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=946669. 
149. Bolton et al. posit that some investors are irrational and, in particular, 
overconfident. Bolton et al., supra note 126, at 726-28. The number and holdings of such 
investors must be small, though. Their behavior may explain the few ''bubbles" featured 
by Bolton et al., but they cannot significantly influence stock prices generally. Large net 
sales would quickly decimate a company's stock price. Thus earnings manipulation cannot 
succeed for more than a few small shareholders, and it is unlikely that a few small 
shareholders could exert much influence under a regime of shareholder primacy. See infra 
notes 353-54 and accompanying text (describing a proposal to institute shareholder 
primacy). 
150. See Anabtawi, supra note 114, at 591-92; Stout, supra note 16, at 794--95. 
151. High River Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490 (M.D. Pa. 2005). 
152. See Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund 
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681, 721 (2007). 
153. See Dale A. Oesterle, Regulating Hedge Funds, 1 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.J. 1, 
25-26 (2006) ("[O]nly a small percentage of most common stock is available to be 
borrowed and an investor will be limited inherently by the supply."). 
154. Id. at 27-28. 
155. I d. at 25. 
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tweaked, 156 but the problem is far too small to justify defanging 
shareholders. 
Shareholder control would not be perfect-no system 
dependent on human beings can be-but it would be far better 
than the CEO-dominated boards we have now. In corporate 
governance, shareholder control may be, as Churchill said of 
democracy, "the worst form of Government except all those other 
forms that have been tried from time to time."157 
III. REALITY: CEO DOMINATION AND ITS COSTS 
A. The Reality: Not Director Primacy but CEO Domination 
Despite the claims for the DPMITPM, the evidence is 
overwhelming that most boards are passive, dominated by CEOs 
who exert their power in their own interests. 158 This insight is far 
from novel. In addition to Berle and Means, seventy years ago 
William 0. Douglas published an article titled Directors Who Do 
Not Direct. 159 He later characterized most outside directors as 
"business colonels of the honorary type-honorary colonels who 
are ornamental in parade but fairly useless in battle."160 That 
passivity persists today. 161 
156. See Frank S. Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and 
Financial Innovation 50-51 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 
06-21, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=931254 (describing some problem 
situations); see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 706-08 (urging higher disclosure 
requirements). These problems arise only because "hedge funds are ... reacting to the 
failure of other institutions to exercise their franchise for the benefit of all shareholders." 
Partnoy & Thomas, supra at 52. 
157. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 202 (4th ed. 1992) (quoting Winston 
Churchill). 
158. "The most significant problem facing corporate America today is the 
management-dominated, passive board of directors." Charles M. Elson, Director 
Compensation and the Management-Captured Board-The History of a Symptom and a 
Cure, 50 SMU L. REV. 127, 127 (1996). See generally Glyn A. Holton, Investor Suffrage 
Movement, 62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 15, 19 (2006) (stating that "[r]ecent market crashes and 
financial scandals are symptomatic of a capitalism in which shareholders have lost 
control over the corporations they own" and urging steps to make shareholder voting more 
effective); Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance 
Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 898, 898-903, 913-17 (1996) 
(cataloging the many ways that CEOs dominate outside directors). Sophisticated 
investors realize this. See Rachel McTague, Advisers, High-Net- Worth Investors Think 
Boards Serve Executives, Survey Says, 39 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1662, 1662 (2007) ("A 
survey of more than 200 investment advisers and high-net-worth investors found that the 
respondents clearly perceive that corporate boards primarily answer to management, 
rather than shareholders."). 
159. William 0. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934). 
160. WILLIA.l'II 0. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46 (1940). 
161. See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How 
Contestable Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 847 (1999) ("Both 
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Boards are passive for many reasons. Most board openings 
are filled on recommendation of the CE0.162 Of course, they 
don't pick anyone expected to rock the boat. The most popular 
choice is other CEOs. 163 They enhance a board's prestige and 
exude independence: presumably one CEO will not kowtow to 
another. Reality is otherwise. A CEO wants directors on "his" 
(rarely "her") board to defer to him, so when he serves as an 
outside director he defers to that firm's CE0.164 The incentive 
to do so is stronger when, as often happens, that firm's CEO is 
also an outside director on "his" board. 165 Also, directors 
naturally feel beholden to the person responsible for their 
selection. 166 
If the selection process errs and chooses someone unwilling 
to knuckle under, the board will probably not be much affected. 
First, the candidate may well decline the offer; to be a constant 
board dissenter is not most people's idea of a good time. If the 
offer is accepted, an atmosphere of "groupthink," in which 
members of a group "adopt[] the goals and methods of the group 
uncritically," pervades most boards and makes it awkward to 
theoretical and empirical reasons exist to believe that boards of a substantial minority, 
and perhaps a substantial majority, of U.S. public corporations are dominated by 
managers."); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting 
Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 136 (2006) (stating that 
board passivity "has continued at many U.S. companies"). 
162. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67, at 193 (noting that, in 1991, 82% of vacancies 
were filled on recommendation of the chairman, who is usually also the CEO); see also 
Carl T. Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 
41 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 34 (1993) (finding in a small survey of the 500 largest companies in 
1989 that "the CEO initially recommended 90-100% of all directorial nominees"); Kevin 
F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and Executive Compensation, 32 
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 331, 332 (1997) (stating that CEOs often choose new 
directors); Benjamin E. Hermalin & MichaelS. Weisbach, Endogenousl:y Chosen Boards of 
Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96-97 (1998) (stating 
that CEOs choose or approve of board nominees). 
163. CEOs of other companies comprise about 63% of outside directors. Ronald J. 
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 875 (1991). 
164. See id. ("These directors are unlikely to monitor more energetically than they 
believe they should be monitored by their own boards."). 
165. See Eliezer M. Fich & Lawrence J. White, CEO Compensation and Turnover: 
The Effects of Mutually Interlocked Boards, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 935, 952 (2003) 
(asserting that "mutually interlocking directorships ... are prevalent"); Anil Shivdasani 
& David Yermack, CEO Involvement in the Selection of New Board Members: An 
Empirical Analysis, 54 J. FIN. 1829, 1852 (1999). Interlocking boards are associated with 
higher CEO compensation. Fich & White, supra at 947-48. 
166. "As long as a director is brought in by the CEO, he will naturally feel that it is 
to the CEO that he owes his loyalty." MONKS & MIN OW, supra note 67, at 497. 
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step out of line.167 It's easier to resign. A stubborn gadfly may not 
be renominated. 168 
Repeated regulatory efforts to increase board independence 
have proved futile or even counterproductive. By rules of the 
SEC, NYSE, and NASDAQ, most large public companies now 
have a majority of "independent" directors on the full board and 
on several oversight committees, 169 but these changes have not 
improved board performance.170 One reason is that 
"independence" is, and probably must be, defined as a lack of 
certain affiliations with the company and its managers.171 
However, many outside directors still have "soft" conflicts of 
interest that are not caught by these definitions of independence. 
167. Stephen J. Choi, Behavioral Economics and the Regulation of Public Offerings, 
10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 85, 124 (2006); see also James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, 
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate 
Cohesion, 48 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83-84, 99-108 (1985) (describing bases of 
ingroup bias among directors); Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: 
Behavioral Science and Corporate Law, 80 lVIrCH. L. REV. 1, 37-43 (1981); Jones, supra 
note 161, at 139-41 (discussing board conformity). Put another way, "the very things that 
make people likely to join a board-connections, business experience, sociability-are also 
the things that make them less effective once they do." James Surowiecki, The Sky-High 
Club, NEW YORKER, Jan. 22, 2007, at 32. 
168. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 163, at 874-75. 
169. See Robert Charles Clark, Corporate Governance Changes in the Wake of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A Morality Tale for Policymakers, Too, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 251, 
282-88 (2006) (describing the NYSE requirements); George W. Dent, Jr., Corporate 
Governance: Still Broke, No Fix in Sight, 31 J. CORP. L. 39, 48 (2005) (listing the relevant 
rules). 
170. Several studies have found no correlation between corporate performance and 
board "independence" as defined by regulations. See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, 
The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 
J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002); Eric M. Fogel & Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: 
Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
33, 51-58 (2007); Gordon, supra note 67, at 34-43 (discussing the empirical literature); 
David F. Larcker et al., How Important Is Corporate Governance? 20-33 (2005) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=595821 (finding little 
correlation between firm performance and several common measures of corporate 
governance quality). Some studies find a positive impact from increased board 
independence. See, e.g., Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, Board of Directors 
Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications, 17 ENTREPRENEURSHIP: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 65, 75 (1993). Some studies find a negative impact from increased 
board independence. See Anup Agrawal & Charles R. Knoeber, Firm Performance and 
Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems Between Managers and Shareholders, 31 J. FIN. 
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 377, 394 (1996); Allen Kaufman et al., The Managerial Power 
Thesis Revised: CEO Compensation and the Independence of Independent CEO Directors 
6 EMP. BENEFITS COMPENSATION & PENSION L.J. (2005), http://ssm.com/abstract=678381 
(finding that after some point a greater number of outside directors is associated with 
worse firm performance); April Klein, Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 
41 J.L. & ECON. 275, 300-01 (1998) (finding negative correlation between firn1 
performance and absence of insiders on a board's finance and investment committees). 
171. Bhagat & Black, supra note 170, at 266 (discussing the failure of purportedly 
independent directors to fall within the "customary definition of independence"). 
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These conflicts correlate with board performance.172 If, against all 
odds, a rebel faction forms, it faces huge obstacles.173 Most boards 
meet about once a month, too little time to match the managers' 
knowledge about the firm. 174 Directors also lack independent 
sources of information; they know only what they are told by the 
managers, the very people they are supposed to oversee. 
Conflicts of interest are intrinsic to all boards. Directors 
set their own compensation, and the CEO influences the board, 
so each has a motive to be generous to the other .175 CEOs can 
increase conflicts, in effect buying a director's loyalty, by 
arranging company gifts to a charity with which the director is 
connected, with consulting and other business ties, and 
through personal and social contacts. 176 When Michael Ovitz 
asked CEO Michael Eisner whether Disney's board would 
approve the lavish contract Eisner proposed for Ovitz, "Eisner 
laughed, ticking off the various ways that board members were 
beholden to him, and assuring Ovitz that they would do what 
he wanted."177 Obsession with board "independence" even may 
be counterproductive. A veneer of board independence gives 
CEOs cover to feather their nests even more aggressively. This 
may help explain why CEO compensation has exploded in 
recent years while board independence supposedly increased. 178 
172. See David F. Larcker et al., Back Door Links Between Directors and Executive 
Compensation 27 (2005) (unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=671063 (finding that even remote links between the CEO and outside directors 
are associated with higher CEO compensation). Such conflicts seem also to have been 
common at firms subject to recent scandals. See SKEEL, supra note 99, at 164-65 
(referencing conflicts on Enron's board). See generally Fich & White, supra note 165 
(discussing the implications of "mutual interlock" relationships within boards). 
173. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 141-48 (1976) 
(discussing the various obstacles faced by outside boards). 
174. See id. at 141-43. One study reported that outside directors devoted, on 
average, only 122 hours per year to their positions. Victor Brudney, The Independent 
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARv. L. REV. 597, 609 n.38 (1982) 
(citing KoRN/FERRY lNT'L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS: EIGHTH ANNuAL STUDY 20 (1981)). 
175. Although their compensation is a small part of the earnings of most directors, 
the amounts are not trivial. Five years ago, compensation at Fortune 200 companies was 
reported to average $152,000 per year. Gary Strauss, Companies Pony Up to Keep 
Directors; Board Seats Have Become Hot Seats, U.S.A. TODAY, Nov. 21, 2002, at Bl. The 
figure is undoubtedly higher now, and it does not include fringe benefits like life and 
medical insurance. 
176. See Brown, Disloyalty Without Limits, supra note 105, at 79--80 (describing a 
corporate gift to a museum for which one of the company's outside directors served as 
president and a trustee); Paredes, supra note 100, at 510-11 (discussing the financial, 
social, and personal pressures directors face in their relationships with company officers). 
177. James B. Stewart, Partners: Eisner, Ovitz, and the Disney Wars, NEW YORKER, 
Jan. 10, 2005, at 46. 
178. Some studies find that a larger number of outside directors correlates to higher 
executive compensation. See John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief Executive 
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In sum, corporate governance today features not director 
primacy but director servility. Boards routinely approve 
classified (staggered) boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority voting requirements, despite their notorious 
destruction of firm value.179 Some directors acknowledge their 
passivity. 180 Peter Drucker, long the premier expert of business 
management, disparaged outside directors as figureheads. 181 
Even more telling is the treatment of the business press. 
Discussions of corporate strategy and performance typically focus 
on the CEO; outside directors are routinely ignored. Higher 
standards of independence will not change this: "no definition of 
independence will ever assure that an independent director will 
indeed act as such."182 
B. The Costs of CEO Domination 
CEO-dominated boards impose great costs on investors. The 
notorious excesses of executive compensation183 belie the 
DPM/TPM. Compensation committees comprised entirely of 
"independent" directors retain expert consultants to recommend 
a compensation package, but the consultants themselves are far 
from disinterested; they are compromised by numerous 
Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 388 (1999); Richard M. Cyert 
eta!., Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-N[anagement Compensation: Theory and 
Evidence, 48 MGMT. Scr. 453, 466 (2002); see also infra notes 183-94 and accompanying 
text (describing the growth and current excesses of executive compensation). 
179. See Frakes, supra note 62, at 150-51; Lucian Bebchuk eta!., What Matters in 
Corporate Governance 16-22 (John lVL Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., 
Discussion Paper No. 491, 2004), available at http://papers.ssm.com/abstract-id=593423 
(study showing that these features lower share value). 
180. See Bengt Holmstrom & Steven N. Kaplan, The State of U.S. Corporate 
Governance: What's Right and What's Wrong, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 15 (2003) 
(discussing a 2002 study by Kom!Ferry International finding that most directors wanted 
their boards to be more assertive). 
181. PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 92 (rev. ed. 1972); see also 
Michael B. Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and 
Optimal Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 263-69 
(2005) (reviewing literature on CEO power). 
182. Luca Enriques, Bad Apples, Bad Oranges: A Comment from Old Europe on Post-
Enron Corporate Governance Reforms, 38 WAI<E FOREST L. REV. 911, 927 (2003). 
183. The literature is immense and grows daily. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE 
FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 1 (2004) [hereinafter BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE]; 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Pay Without Performance: Overview of the Issues, 30 
J. CORP. L. 647, 648-49 (2005) (responding to criticisms of BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY 
WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra); John C. Bogle, The Executive Compensation System Is 
Broken, 30 J. CORP. L. 761, 763 (2005). The escalation of executive compensation is 
disproportionally concentrated in CEOs. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et a!., Pay Distribution 
in the Top Executive Team (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., 
Discussion Paper No. 574, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=954609. 
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incentives to inflate executive pay.184 Executive perquisites, like 
luxurious offices and recreational facilities, large support staffs, 
and private jets, are more lavish in public companies than in 
comparable private firms 185 and can be quite costly.186 Self-dealing 
is also common.187 
Even more troubling than the gross amounts of executive 
pay are the many glaring design flaws. Often companies do not 
tie compensation to performance.188 Plans that are performance-
based are rarely indexed, so executives reap windfalls if their 
industry, or the market generally, just hits good times.189 
Executives can also circumvent performance conditions by 
"exercising options, selling shares, or using derivatives to hedge 
their positions."190 One study found a negative correlation 
between executive compensation and performance in firms with 
no large shareholders. 191 Over 2,000 companies issued backdated 
options so that executives could profit even if the company's stock 
price languished.192 This activity is especially offensive because 
its costs to shareholders far exceed its benefits to the favored 
executives. 193 In both size and design, executive pay schemes 
184. See Gretchen Morgenson, Corporate America's Pay Pal, N.Y TIMES, Oct. 15, 
2006, § 3, at 1 (chronicling how one consulting firm repeatedly boosted executive 
compensation for over 1,800 clients); Gretchen Morgenson, Outside Advice on Boss's Pay 
May Not Be So Independent, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at A1 (discussing the "long and 
lucrative relationship" between one executive-compensation consulting firm and its 
client); see also Cox, supra note 98, at 106 ("The role of the compensation consultant is 
fraught with conflicting interests .... "); Fogel & Geier, supra note 170, at 63-64 
("[M]anagers use the compensation consultants as 'camouflage' to extract premium rents 
from the compensation committee."). 
185. See WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, MANAGERIAL CONTROL AND PERFORI'vlANCE 65-66, 
80, 86-87 (1975) (reviewing empirical studies). 
186. See David Yermack, Flights of Fancy: Corporate Jets, CEO Perquisites, and 
Inferior Shareholder Returns, 80 J. FIN. ECON. 211, 213 (2006) (showing that personal 
CEO use of company planes is associated with average shareholder returns that 
"underperform market benchmarks by more than 4% ... per year"). 
187. See Elizabeth A Gordon et al., Related Party Transactions: Associations with 
Corporate Governance and Firm Value 4-5 (EFA Maastricht Meetings Paper No. 4377, 
2004), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=558983. 
188. See BEBCHUK & FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 183, at 121. 
The percentage of profits going to top executives nearly doubled between 1993 and 2003. 
Lucian Bebchuk & Yaniv Grinstein, The Growth of Executive Pay, 21 OXFORD REV. EcoN. 
POL 'Y 283, 287 (2005). 
189. Hohnstrom & Kaplan, supra note 180, at 13. 
190. Id. 
191. See Robert Daines et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Lucky: CEO Pay and Skill 
17 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 04-035, 2005), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=622223. 
192. See Stephanie Saul, Study Finds Backdating of Options Widespread, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 2006, at C1. 
193. See M.P. Narayanan et al., The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive 
Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1600-01 (2007) (finding that the average loss per 
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stink of control by management-not by independent directors 
bent on optimizing firm performance. Thus, Warren Buffett has 
called compensation committees "tail-wagging puppy dogs."194 
Compensation plans also distort disclosure. Managers doctor 
share prices by withholding or falsifying information, then trade 
in the company's stock at prices they know are wrong. In "pump 
and dump" schemes managers inflate the firm's stock price by 
releasing false good news and suppressing bad news. They then 
sell their own stock at inflated prices, often after exercising stock 
options that had no value until the market was fixed. 195 Directors 
responsive to shareholders would police such misconduct, but 
most CEO-dominated boards don't even try. In the many recent 
scandals involving fraudulent disclosures, boards made little 
effort to detect or deter the fraud or to discipline guilty officers 
who were caught by others. 196 
Even if they don't break the law, CEOs often enrich 
themselves by their choices within the broad discretion offered by 
generally accepted accounting principles. Executive pay is often 
tied to reported earnings, and many managers choose accounting 
methods that increase reported earnings instead of the 
shareholders' preferred goal of maximizing share price.197 
Although some claim the TPM benefits employees, wage 
disparities between CEOs and average workers have soared in 
recent years. These extreme disparities "result in greater 
firm to shareholders was around $380 million but the potential gain to all the executives 
benefited in each firm averaged under $500,000). 
194. See Surowiecki, supra note 167, at 32. 
195. See generally ROBERT H. TILLMAN & MICHAEL L. INDERGAARD, PuMP AND DUMP: 
THE RANCID RULES OF THE NEW ECONOMY (2005); Jap Efendi et al., Why Do Corporate 
Managers Misstate Financial Statements? The Role of Option Compensation and Other 
Factors, 85 J. FIN. ECON. 667, 703-04 (2007); John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate 
Scandals: Why the U.S. and Europe Differ 6-8 (Ctr. for Law & Econ. Studies, Working 
Paper No. 274, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=694581 (noting that an 
industry-wide shift to equity-based compensation created incentives for market and 
accounting manipulation). Managers also time corporate disclosures to maximize their 
profits on stock options. See David Aboody & Ron Kasznik, CEO Stock Option Awards and 
the Timing of Corporate Voluntary Disclosures, 29 J. ACCT. & ECON. 73, 74 (2000); Keith 
Chauvin & Catherine Shenoy, Stock Price Decreases Prior to Executive Stock Option 
Grants, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 53, 59 (2001); Erik Lie, On the Timing of CEO Stock Option 
Awards, 51 MGMT. SCI. 802, 802 (2005); David Yermack, Good Timing: CEO Stock Option 
Awards and Company News Announcements, 52 J. FIN. 449, 449-50 (1997). 
196. See, e.g., Carrie Johnson & Ben White, Opportunity for Corporate Fraud Has 
Shrunk-But It's Still There, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 26, 2006, at Dl (recalling the wake 
of Enron and noting how "[b]oards of directors ... turned a blind eye to overly aggressive 
business practices"). 
197. David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate Behavior 14-15 (Boston 
Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 06-05, 2006), 
available at http:l/ssm.com/abstract=894002. 
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personnel turnover, lower employee morale, poorer product 
quality, and lower productivity."198 
Some CEOs use their power to pursue growth, or "empire 
building." They reinvest retained earnings even if they have no 
promising investment opportunities. 199 They are often rewarded 
for increasing firm size independent of profits.200 As a result, 
returns on reinvested profits tend to be low.201 Unprofitable 
acquisitions are common.202 Other CEOs do the opposite-leading 
the "quiet life" through underinvestment.203 This does not mean 
that they maximize dividends, however. They may finance with 
retained earnings rather than incurring debt or even use profits 
to reduce debt, despite the lower cost and tax advantages of debt. 
In so doing, they avoid the discipline debt imposes on 
204 
managers. 
The discretion managers enjoy from the separation of 
ownership and control itself introduces uncertainties that impede 
market efficiency. Skillful managers may earn high profits, but 
investors cannot be sure when or how much of those profits will 
198. Cox, supra note 98, at 114. 
199. This misuse of earnings lowers dividend payouts. See D. Denis, Twenty-Five 
Years of Corporate Governance Research and Counting, 10 REV. FIN. ECON. 191, 195 
(2001) (noting managers' preference to "hold on to cash flow and/or invest it in negative 
NPV projects rather than return it to shareholders"); Rafael La Porta et al., Investor 
Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147, 1148-49 (2002). 
200. See Bebchuk & Grinstein, supra note 188, at 287 (asserting that 60% of average 
CEO compensation increases over a ten year period were not explained by changes in firm 
size and performance). 
201. William J. Baumol et al., Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REV. 
ECON. & STATISTICS 128, 130 (1973); see also William J. Baumol et al., Earnings 
Retention, New Capital and the Growth of the Firm, 52 REV. ECON. & STATISTICS 345, 354 
(1970) (showing that firms that issued little equity had returns on reinvestment of 
retained earnings that approached zero). 
202. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 34, at 614 (stating that "studies of acquiring 
company stock performance report results ranging from no statistically significant stock 
price effect to statistically significant losses"); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, 
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 300-02 (2d ed. 1995). Further, 
"[a]cquiring firms appear to suffer negative abnormal returns in the several years 
following the transaction." Id. at 309. The highest prices tend to be paid by publicly 
traded acquirers whose managers own the least amount of their companies' stock. Leonce 
Bargeron et al., Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?, 
20-23 (Fisher Coil. of Bus., Ohio St. Univ., Working Paper No. 2007-03-011, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=980066. 
203. See supra text accompanying note 140 (quoting 0yvind B~hren); see also Kose 
John et al., Corporate Governance and Risk-Taking 1 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=979413 ("When ... private benefits are 
large, insiders may undertake sub-optimally conservative investment decisions to 
preserve them. Better investor protection reduces these private benefits and may 
therefore induce riskier but value enhancing investment policy."). 
204. See Jensen, supra note 142, at 321-23 (discussing how debt disciplines 
managers). 
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be paid to them rather than appropriated by the managers. 205 If 
managers are incompetent or greedy, investors cannot know how 
soon those managers will retire or die and whom they will choose 
to succeed them. 
Boards strive to entrench themselves and the CEO. Many 
firms have staggered boards, poison pills, golden parachutes, and 
supermajority voting requirements. Boards loyal to shareholders 
could use these devices to prevent a raider from exploiting the 
shareholders' disorganization to grab the company at a 
suboptimal price. In practice, though, these devices are used to 
block attractive takeover bids, as evidenced by the damage that 
adoption of these devices does to share value. 206 When a firm 
thwarts a bid and stays independent, its stock price typically 
falls to pre-offer levels; stockholders simply lose the chance for a 
big premium. 207 
Because those who control a company can abuse their power 
to benefit themselves at the expense of shareholders, corporate 
law developed derivative suits as a means for courts to scrutinize 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duties.208 However, the law also 
requires that, before filing a derivative suit, a shareholder must 
make a demand on the board to correct the alleged breach, unless 
demand is futile because wrongdoers dominate the board.209 This 
requirement supposedly allows the board to protect the 
corporation from wastefullitigation.210 
To see how absurd this rule is, imagine the reaction if the 
defendant in any other type of litigation proposed to have a group 
of her business associates, chosen by her, decide whether the 
plaintiffs suit against her should be allowed to proceed. The 
problems inherent in this approach are obvious. I do not know of 
205. See Jensen, supra note 19, at 10 (arguing that waste of free cash flow helps 
explains the apparent under-pricing of some public companies); see also Lucian A 
Bebchuk et al., CEO Centrality (Harvard Law and Econ. Discussion Paper No. 601, Nov. 
2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1030107 (asserting that greater CEO 
dominance is associated with, inter alia, lower firm value, profitability, and stock 
retums). 
206. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 179, at 2-3 (showing that a six-factor 
entrenchment index is associated with significantly lower firm value). The presence of 
antitakeover devices is associated with higher CEO compensation. BEBCHUK & FRIED, 
PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE, supra note 183, at 84. 
207. See Michael Bradley et al., The Rationale Behind Interfirm Tender Offers: 
Information Or Synergy?, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 183 (1983); Richard S. Ruback, Do Target 
Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful Control Contests?, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 137, 137 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988). 
208. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 639-40 (1986). 
209. See id. at 640-49. 
210. See, e.g., Alan J. Meese, The Team Production Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Critical Assessment, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1629, 1681 (2002). 
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a single case where a board reacted to a shareholder demand by 
saying, "Gosh! We had no idea of this misconduct. Thanks for 
telling us," and then promptly rectified the wrong. 
This account of boards' kowtowing to CEOs is severely 
abridged. It could be much longer, but the facts have been 
elaborated by others, and the point, I hope, has been made: 
Contrary to the claims of the TPM/DPM, boards of most public 
companies are not independent mediators of conflicting interests 
among shareholders, or between shareholders and stakeholders. 
Most boards are dominated by their CEO and serve his interests, 
at great cost to shareholders and with considerable loss of 
efficiency, to the detriment of society in general. 
What is needed is "an external corrective mechanism."211 The 
most effective corrective is shareholder power. "Firms with 
strong shareholder rights and high institutional ownership are 
found to earn abnormal retums and have higher accounting 
profitability."212 Executive compensation is more reasonable in 
companies with strong shareholder rights213 and correlates more 
closely with firm performance in companies with one or more 
shareholders large enough to exert some influence. 214 These facts 
also refute claims that executive compensation in companies with 
CEO-dominated boards is reasonable and efficient. If the lower 
compensation more closely attuned to performance in companies 
with strong shareholders was inadequate, their performance 
should be worse. In fact, it is superior. 
IV. THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Champions of the DPMtrPM claim that market forces have 
brought corporate governance to Nirvana, to maximum 
efficiency. This claim is laughable. Markets operate within the 
law; misguided laws impair market efficiency. Further, markets 
211. Jones, supra note 161, at 139. 
212. Reena Aggarwal & Rohan Williamson, Did New Regulations Target the 
Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes? 6 (Feb. 12, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=859264; see also Vidhi Chhaochharia & Luc Laeven, 
The Invisible Hand in Corporate Governance 4 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance 
Working Paper No. 165/2007, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=965733 (finding 
that "governance provisions adopted beyond those imposed by the 'norms' in the country 
have a strong, positive effect on firm valuation"). 
213. Pornsit Jiraporn et al., CEO Compensation, Shareholder Rights, and Corporate 
Governance: An Empirical Investigation, 29 J. ECON. & FIN. 242, 243 (2005). 
214. See Daines et al., supra note 191, at 17; see also Michael C. Jensen et al., 
Remuneration: Where We've Been, How We Got to Here, What Are the Problems, and How 
to Fix Them 75-76 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Negotiations, Orgs., & Markets Research Paper, 
Working Paper No. 04-28, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=561305 (arguing 
that corporations should externalize performance-based standards). 
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are not frictionless. Inter alia, transaction costs and information 
asymmetries affect markets. Markets also take time; they do not 
work instantaneously. Corporate governance has not reached 
perfection; it is still evolving.215 However, market forces are 
altering corporate govemance in ways that erode the DPM/TPM 
and foster shareholder primacy. 
A. The Governance of Public Companies 
1. Legal Obstacles to Shareholder Primacy. One obstacle to 
shareholder power is that poor managers can be ousted only by a 
proxy fight or when someone new purchases control of the 
company. Both options are difficult and expensive. In proxy 
fights, incumbents enjoy huge advantages; the firm pays their 
expenses, but insurgents must bear their own costs. 216 Collective 
action problems and other obstacles hinder shareholders from 
waging effective proxy insurgencies. 217 The problems would be 
smaller if a few institutions owned large blocks of a company's 
stock, but there are economic limits on such holdings. 218 The law 
215. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have argued that. the "standard 
shareholder-oriented model" of corporate governance was "the most attractive social ideal 
for the organization of large-scale enterprise," as well as "the most efficient way to 
organize large-scale industry," and that "practice and law are, as a matter of fact, 
converging on" this model. Henry Hansmarrn, How Close Is the End of History?, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 745, 746--48 (2006) (discussing Henry Hansmarrn & Reinier Kraakman, The End 
of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001)). They did not predict that this 
would happen promptly; they "carefully avoided offering any timeframe for future 
convergence." Id. at 748. The rise of the "shareholder-oriented model," or shareholder 
primacy, could encounter "interruptions." Id. at 749. However, "convergence in fact has 
proceeded quite quickly" in recent years. Id. at 748; see also Gianni de Nicolo et a!., 
Corporate Governance Quality: Trends and Real Effects 5 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. 06/293, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=956757; Mathias M. Siems, 
Shareholder Protection Around the World 1 (June 29, 2007) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991092 (finding that "in general there has been a 
convergence in the last decade" in international standards of shareholder protection). 
216. Arthur R. Pinto, Corporate Governance: Monitoring the Board of Directors in 
American Corporations, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. (SUPP.) 317, 337 (1998) (explaining why proxy 
fights are rarely successful). 
217. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 
675, 688-94 (2007) (discussing impediments to electoral challenges); Black, supra note 5, 
at 536 (discussing the burdens the proxy rules place on shareholders); see also infra notes 
234-37 and accompanying text (discussing shareholders' collective action problems). 
Management also has superior access to information about voting outcomes and can 
engage in vote buying and selective vote counting so that it almost "always wins the close 
ones." Yair Listokin, Management Always Wins the Close Ones 4 (John M. Olin Center for 
Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy, Research Paper No. 348), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=980695. 
218. 
[An investor] may often be impeded by limitations on her capital; limitations on 
her borrowing ability; regulatory and practical limits on some kinds of trading 
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also discourages large accumulations.219 And there are "social 
constraints and fear: fear that a successful effort at control [by 
financial institutions) will trigger a political reaction."220 AB a 
result, serious proxy fights are rare, especially in larger public 
companies.221 Through a friendly acquisition a buyer can 
eliminate the agency costs of director primacy, but incumbent 
managers can and do demand personal benefits (in effect, bribes) 
in return for approving the deal. 222 
Hostile takeovers avoid this problem. They benefit 
shareholders and the whole economy by removmg poor 
managements. 223 Hostile acquisitions are hindered, though, by 
high transaction costs and, more important, by antitakeover 
devices like poison pills and staggered boards.224 If a hostile 
takeover is possible at all, the raider usually must offer target 
shareholders a premium of at least thirty-five percent over its 
(for example, short selling); the necessity of bearing risk; and a need to meet 
short-term goals and metrics that makes it impossible to exploit mispricing that 
cannot be counted upon to disappear very quickly. 
Stout, supra note 63, at 1441. 
219. Large shareholders are subject to special disclosure rules. Securities Exchange 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2000). They are also subject to insider trading and short-swing 
profit rules. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.10b-5, 240.14e-3, & 240.16a-1 to 240.16b-8 (2007); see also 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 
671, 712-13 (1995). Large shareholders who work together could also trigger a company's 
poison pill. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 202, at 1434-35. 
220. Roe, supra note 118, at 30; see also id. at 31-53 (discussing the history of 
hostility to large shareholder influence in America). 
221. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to the 
Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 559 (2005). 
222. See GEVURTZ, supra note 7, § 4.2.6, at 360 (stating that side payments to 
insiders are permitted if ostensibly given for valid consideration and not as a bribe). 
223. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 112 (citing study showing that "target companies 
had underperformed their peers by 45 percent in return on equity, by 73 percent in 
growth rate, and by 25 percent in market-to-book value"). Critics of this claim note that 
acquirers do not seek out poorly managed companies; many prefer well managed 
companies. LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STREET: SHORT-TERM GAIN 
AND THE ABSENTEE SHAREHOLDER 134-35 (1988); John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the 
Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in 
Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV.ll45, 1211-12 (1984) (citing surveys ofbidders). 
The latter claim is partly true, but does not contradict the former. Acquirers seek firms 
whose stock price is far below intrinsic value. This can happen when a company is 
operationally efficient but wastes cash flow or seems likely to do so in the future. See 
Jensen, supra note 19, at 13-14. 
224. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 62, at 430 (reporting study finding that 
staggered boards are associated with significantly reduced firm value); Lucian Bebchuk, 
Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements, 152 U. FA. L: REv. 713, 714 (2003); 
Kenneth A. Borokhovich et al., CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments, 52 J. 
FIN. 1495, 1515 (1997) (showing that takeover defenses are associated with higher agency 
costs and poor performance); Ronald W. Masulis et al., Corporate Governance and 
Acquirer Returns, 62 J. FIN. 1851, 1854 (2007) (showing negative correlation between the 
strength of a firm's anti takeover provisions and profitability of its acquisitions). 
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pre-offer stock price.225 Thus incumbents can waste at least 
twenty-five percent of profits before they risk a hostile raid. As a 
result, hostile tender offers are almost as rare as serious proxy 
fights. 226 Some protest that boards generally reject only 
inadequate takeover bids.227 The evidence is to the contrary: 
''When incumbents defeat offers, shareholders experience on 
average a significant decline in stock value ... :ma 
Rarely can shareholders use litigation to call directors to 
account. Courts will not intervene unless the board's conduct is 
so bad that it evinces "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious 
disregard for one's responsibilities."229 Stricter scrutiny applies 
when directors are self-interested, but this scrutiny can be 
evaded by delegating a decision to fellow directors with no 
personal stake in the matter, even though those directors have 
ties to the interested directors that would clearly disqualify them 
in other situations, such as judge and litigant. 230 Actions with no 
direct financial dealing between the firm and directors, but that 
cement the incumbents' control, are reviewed less rigorously.231 
Finally, most suits to hold directors accountable must be brought 
as derivative suits, which face many procedural obstacles, 
especially a requirement to show that the board is dominated by 
persons directly monetarily threatened by the suit. 232 As a result, 
only crude or clumsy looting can be challenged by shareholder 
suits. 
225. See Bebchuk et al., supra note 62, at 934-36 (giving data on takeover 
premiums). 
226. See id. at 925 (study showing that, from January 1996 to December 2000, only 
ninety-two of 2421 (3.8%) large public companies received an unfriendly takeover bid). In 
only twenty-three of these bids was the target ultimately acquired by the initial bidder. 
Id. at 933. 
227. See Stout, supra riote 63, at 1439. 
228. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 973, 1004 (2002); see also supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
229. In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d 27, 64 (Del. 2006). Some argue that this leeway 
is necessary so that managers can sacrifice profits in the interests of shareholders. See 
Elhauge, supra note 47, at 770-71. Where sacrificing short term profits enhances share 
value, it should be supported by shareholders at least as much as by managers. 
230. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (2001) (allowing interested transactions if 
approved by a majority of disinterested directors); Brown, supra note 105, at 55-56, 77, 83 
(criticizing Delaware courts' disregard of connections between interested and "non-
interested" directors); id. at 70 (stating that this approach ''has been labeled by some as 
an abject failure"). 
231. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55 (Del. 1985) 
(applying a standard somewhere between the business judgment test and the strict 
scrutiny standard to takeover defenses). 
232. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-16 (Del. 1984) (requiring 
particularized fact allegations of corporate direction of improper conduct), overruled on 
other grounds, Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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2. The Shareholders' Collective Action Problem and 
Management Pressure. Shareholders suffer from a collective 
action problem. A shareholder who wins a proxy fight and raises 
the firm's equity value gets only a pro rata part of the increase 
but cannot compel other shareholders to share the proxy costs; 
they can "free ride" on the effort of the insurgent. 233 An 
institutional investor who bore all these costs would suffer a cost 
disadvantage vis-a-vis competing institutions;234 thus, passivity 
pays.235 Many institutional investors are also vulnerable to 
management pressure when they vote. 236 Nonetheless, 
antitakeover devices so damage shareholders' interests that 
opposition to them is now widespread and often succeeds.237 
3. Problems of Information. The widely accepted "semi-
strong" version of the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
posits that capital markets quickly impound all public 
information. 238 However, corporate managers can and often do 
distort share prices by deceptive publicity.239 Such deception 
violates the federal securities laws240 but is difficult to detect 
and prove. 
233. Black, supra note 5, at 527-28. 
234. Because of competition, most institutional investors are cost-conscious. See 
Rock, supra note 116, at 460-63, 473-74. 
235. See ROBERT A. G. MONKS & A. SYKES, CAPITALISM WITHOUT OWNERS WILL FAIL: 
A POLICYMAKER'S GUIDE TO REFORM 14 (2002) (''Passive institutions gain 95% or more of 
the benefit from any successful shareholder action at no cost-and with a real chance of 
winning business away from the more activist group."); Shann Turnbull, Invigorating 
Capitalism 4 (Sixth Int'l Conference on Corporate Governance & Ed. Leadership Paper, 
2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=437981 (indicating that cost-benefit analysis, 
free-riders, and uncertain outcomes prompt "institutional shareholders to be 'reluctant,' 
apathetic or negligent in exercising their ownership rights"). This situation may be 
changing. See infra notes 300-36 and accompanying text (describing growing shareholder 
activism and its effects). 
236. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 52 (stating that CEOs pressure pension fund 
managers to vote with management); Dent, supra note 169, at 55 n.98·. For a good case 
study, see Gretchen Morgenson, Investors us. Pfizer: Guess Who Has the Guns?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 32, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
237. See Michael D. Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, Private Equity, and 
Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757-62 (2003) (giving 
figures on shareholder opposition to various antitakeover devices); Randall S. Thomas & 
James F. Cotter, Shareholder Proposals in the New Millennium: Shareholder Support, 
Board Response, and Market Reaction, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 368, 369, 377-78 (2007) 
(documenting growing support for shareholder proposals, especially those opposing 
anti takeover devices). 
238. See BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 12, at 351. 
239. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
240. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2007) (forbidding manipulation and deception in 
connection with the sale or purchase of securities). 
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Even if public information is accurate, investors have 
limited capacity to process it. Investors act with bounded 
rationality; that is, they expend resources to analyze 
information only to the point at which it seems that the profits 
from analysis exceed the costs. 241 As one result, the choice of 
corporate governance rules is 
influenced by "network externalities." It is advantageous for 
a company to offer an arrangement that is familiar to 
institutional investors, that facilitates pricing relative to 
other companies, that is backed by a developed body of 
precedents and judges familiar with the arrangement. 
Conversely, companies are discouraged from adopting 
arrangements that are unconventional and radically 
different from those in other companies.242 
Even a large institutional investor trading the securities of, 
or casting proxy votes for, a large issuer generally does not find it 
worthwhile to conduct extensive research into the quality of the 
issuer's corporate governance system or to speculate about the 
value of novel charter terms. 243 As a result, charters of public 
companies are remarkably uniform. 244 
Until recently, most institutions relied on rating and 
advisory services to evaluate corporate govemance, 245 and these 
services generally used a single template rather than judging the 
unique circumstances of each issuer.246 Even an investor who 
knew that antitakeover devices harm firm value also knew that 
the market did not factor such devices into stock prices. 247 The 
241. See Choi, supra note 167, at 112-13. See generally David M. Kreps, Bounded 
Rationality, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 168, 172 
(Peter Newman ed., 1998) ("[H]igh levels of analysis will not be undertaken for small 
stakes .... "). 
242. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 833, 890 (2005) (footnote omitted). 
243. See Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do !PO Charters Maximize Firm 
Value?: Antitakeouer Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 113 (2001) ("Perhaps 
govemance terms are expensive for investors to price at the time of the IPO. This would 
allow management to get protection at low (or no) cost."). 
244. See Michael Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A 
Generation Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 784-91 (2006). 
245. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 889-90, 
897 (2007) (describing extensive use of advisory services by institutional investors); id. at 
907-16 (describing "one-size-fits-all" approach and extensive use of "rules of thumb" by 
advisory services). 
246. See id. at 908. 
247. In effect, this is a networking problem. See Mark A Lemley & David McGowan, 
Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 483 (1998) (noting 
that network externalities arise "where purchasers find a good more valuable as 
additional purchasers buy the same good"). 
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investor could profit from its insight only by buying stock of firms 
without antitakeover provisions and holding them until they 
were acquired. Few investors can wait that long. Rating and 
advisory services are growing more sophisticated in analyzing 
corporate governance, though, with the result that institutional 
investors are becoming more assertive about governance issues.248 
The information problems of investors are exacerbated by 
conflicts of interest among financial advisors. In several recent 
cases, analysts defrauded their own clients by advising them to 
buy a stock that the analyst himself was selling.249 Many 
analysts' employers coerce them to recommend companies with 
which the employer does business.250 Employers also pressure 
advisors to generate commissions by encouraging clients to trade 
more than they should. Accordingly, even though markets are not 
perfectly efficient, many investors decide it is not worth the costs 
and risks to try to beat the market; they prefer to index.251 
4. Markets Take Time. The investor's difficulty is escalated 
by the fact that the correction of a stock mispricing may take a 
long time. The longer the correction takes, the greater the 
deviation must be to promise an adequate rate of return. A long 
wait also exacerbates investors' doubts about whether an 
analyst's claim of mispricing is true. Even if the analyst is right, 
clients may lose faith and bail out before the correction occurs. 
This problem plagues mutual funds. A fund that 
underperforms for several quarters can proclaim that its strategy 
is sound and just needs time to bear fruit, but it is hard for 
investors to validate such claims. Many will move their money 
elsewhere. Because funds realize economies of scale, funds 
suffering large redemptions are at a disadvantage to competitors 
even if they have a superior investment strategy.252 Thus it is 
safer for a fund not to bank on long-term profits. 
248. See infra notes 314-21 and accompanying text. 
249. See Jill E. Fisch, Regulatory Responses to Investor Irrationality: The Case of the 
Research Analyst, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 57, 58, 60-64 (2006) (cataloging analyst 
conflicts of interest that lead to biased reports and recommendations). 
250. See Lily Fang & Ayako Yasuda, Analyst Reputation, Underwriting Pressure and 
Forecast Accuracy 4, 24 (The Wharton Sch., Univ. of Pa., Working Paper No. 24-04, 2005), 
available at http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/-rlwctr/papers/0507.pdf ("Conflict of 
interest is expected to be more severe in top-tier banks because these banks have a strong 
tradition to reward analysts for the generation of underwriting business."). 
251. See JOHN C. BOGLE, JOHN BOGLE ON INvESTING: THE FIRST 50 YEARS 41-42 
(2000) (describing the theory and practice of indexing). 
252. See Rock, supra note 116, at 480 (debating why pension fund managers pursue 
strong governance matters with greater zeal than private mutual fund managers). 
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Superior returns should then be available to investors who 
will absorb the high cost of finding mispriced stocks and make 
large enough investments to cover these costs, then wait as long 
as necessary for prices to be corrected. In theory, that is the role 
of arbitrageurs, but their activity is hampered by limited capital 
and borrowing capacity and by legal restraints on some kinds of 
trading (like short selling). As a result, most are unwilling or 
unable to make large, long-term investments in supposedly 
mispriced issues. 253 
In sum, there are many impediments, both 
economic, that hinder the creation of optimal 
254 governance arrangements. 
B. Initial Public Offerings 
legal and 
corporate 
Some defenders of the DPM/TPM acknowledge problems 
with the EMCGH for firms that are already public, so they 
focus instead on IPOs. They argue that companies going public 
offer the most attractive corporate governance rules in order to 
fetch the highest possible price for their stock in the IP0. 255 
However, empirical studies cast grave doubt on whether 
antitakeover provisions (ATPs), for example, benefit public 
shareholders. 256 Of course, selling shareholders may 
253. For discussions of the limits of arbitrage, see generally Gordon Gemmil & Dylan 
C. Thomas, Noise Trading, Costly Arbitrage, and Asset Prices: Evidence from Closed End 
Funds, 57 J. FIN. 2571, 2590 (2002); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishney, The Limits of 
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 35-37 (1997); Jeremy C. Stein, Why Are Most Funds Open-End? 
Competition and the Limits of Arbitrage, 119 Q.J. ECON. 247, 247-48 (2005), Daniel A. 
Cohen et al., Earnings Announcement Premia and the Limits to Arbitrage 27-31 (2004) 
(unpublished working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642045. 
254. See Klausner, supra note 244, at 797 ("[T]ransaction costs that stem from 
learning and network externalities, and perhaps other market imperfections, impede 
[legally binding corporate governance agreements] and instead drive firms en masse 
towards incorporating in Delaware and adopting charters comprised of a limited and 
familiar set of highly standardized terms."). 
255. See Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 1737; Gordon, supra note 114, at 358 (positing 
that "entrepreneurs selling stock to the public would bear the cost" of suboptimal 
corporate governance provisions); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate 
Constitutionalism: Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 
473, 502 (2003) ("[W]e continue to believe that the IPO charter terms provide substantial 
evidence of appropriate governance structures."); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses 
Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post I Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
845, 853-56 (2002) ("Shareholders act as if they value corporate governance rules that 
insulate boards from hostile takeovers."). 
256. See Daines & Klausner, supra note 243, at 97-106; Julian Atanassov, Quiet Life 
or Managerial Myopia: Is the Threat of Hostile Takeovers Beneficial for Technological 
Innovation (EFA 2007 Ljubljana Meetings Paper Aug. 2007), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=967421 (concluding that executives talce advantage of 
anti takeover laws to lead a "quiet life" rather than to overcome the detriments of investor 
myopia). 
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consciously accept a lower offering price in exchange for 
retaining the perquisites of control; that is legitimate. 
However, there are always minority shareholders who must 
also live with the lower stock price but do not share in control. 
Further, there may be benefits to controlling shareholders in 
th. h 257 IS exc ange. 
Venture capital firms may also accept a suboptimal IPO 
price in exchange for retaining a voice in control. A low offering 
price reduces returns to the fund managed by the venture capital 
firm and thus largely reduces benefits to the limited partners 
who are the fund's passive investors. 258 The partners in the 
venture capital firm, however, hold board seats from which they 
personally benefit through both direct compensation and access 
to inside information.259 By acceding to managers in an IPO, 
venture capitalists also preserve a reputation for cooperating 
with entrepreneurs, a reputation that benefits other funds the 
firm manages. 260 
Further, the IPO market may not be efficient. IPOs depend 
heavily on underwriters' marketing to irrational "sentiment" or 
"noise" investors261 who may be vulnerable to the inflated 
earnings reports common to IPO firms.262 Many IPO underwriters 
257. See Bebchuk, supra note 224, at 716 (noting that those who "will continue to run 
the finn after the IPO ... will fully capture the benefits of [ATPs] and will bear only part 
of the cost of reduced IPO share price"). In about one-third of IPOs from 1996 to 2000, 
executives received stock options at an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price. See 
Michelle Lowry & Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Stock Options and IPO Underpricing, 85 J . 
FIN. EcoN. 39,40 (2007). In one study over half these executives realized a net profit from 
underpricing of the IPO. Id. at 43-45. There are also tax benefits to ATPs. By retaining 
control, insiders can extract tangible benefits (like luxurious offices and expense accounts) 
and intangible benefits (like the prestige of autocracy) that are not taxed at all. Cf Daines 
& Klausner, supra note 243, at 85 (hypothesizing that ATPs may be used at the IPO stage 
to protect incumbents' large private benefits). In effect, the U.S. Treasury bears some of 
the agency costs of the separation of ownership and control. 
258. See Graeme Camp et al., Incentives to Underprice, 46 ACCT. & FIN. 537, 539 
(2006) (stating that underpricing of an offering may "generate compensatory benefits in 
the aftermarket"); see also JOSEPH SHADE, BUSINESS AsSOCIATIONS IN A NUTSHELL 33-35 
(2d ed. 2006) (describing, inter alia, limited partnerships and their use in venture capital 
firms). 
259. See Douglas C=ing & Jeffrey Macintosh, Boom, Bust, and Litigation in 
Venture Capital Finance, 40 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 867, 892-93 (2004) (discussing ways in 
which venture capital firms may favor themselves over the funds they advise). 
260. See Klausner, supra note 237, at 770-71 ("[A]n important concern ... is 
whether the fund's reputation for working well with management is at risk."). 
261. See Fran~;ois Derrien, IPO Pricing in "Hot" Market Conditions: Who Leaves 
Money on the Table?, 60 J. FIN. 487, 497-98 (2005); Alexander P. Ljungqvist et al., Hot 
Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO Pricing 31, 34-36 CAFA San Diego Meetings, Nov. 6 
2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstract_id=282293. 
262. See Bolton et al., supra note 126, at 733 (discussing earnings manipulation by 
pre-IPO firms); Fran«;:ois DeGeorges & Richard Zeckhauser, The Reverse LBO Decision 
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require customers to buy the stock in the aftermarket in return 
for IPO allocations ("tie-in" agreements), a practice that distorts 
prices in the aftermarket.263 In effect, the managers of IPO firms, 
their largest outside shareholders (often venture capital firms), 
and the underwriters create complex distributions in which they 
all profit at the expense of small investors.264 As a result, IPOs 
tend to be overpriced.265 ATPs and other corporate governance 
features that benefit the managers at the expense of the 
purchasers in the IPO may be part of the benefits the managers 
realize from these market distortions. 
Sales of IPOs are abetted by the underwriter's securities 
analysts. They rate IPO issues underwritten by affiliated 
investment bankers more favorably than do unaffiliated 
analysts.266 That practice may now end because investors have 
caught on, or because of new laws and regulatory pressure 
against such behavior, or both.267 Even if the practice has 
diminished, though, the ability of investment banks to indulge in 
such behavior for many years illustrates the imperfection of the 
IPO market. 
It makes little sense for investors to try to price novel 
corporate governance features for transactions as small as the 
and Firm Performance: Theory and Evidence, 48 J. FIN. 1323, 1324-30 (1993) (finding 
frequent earnings manipulation by LBO firms prior to going public again). Asymmetric 
risk may also motivate underwriters to set low prices in IPOs. See Atanu Saha & Allen 
Ferrell, An Asymmetric Payoff-Based Explanation of IPO "Underpricing" 2, 12 (John M. 
Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 587, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=991917. However, setting low prices may offset the 
disadvantages of the issuer's inefficient corporate governance to investors. 
263. See Rajesh K. Aggarwal et al., Underwriter Manipulation in Initial Public 
Offerings 7-9 (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=686252 (providing 
examples of recent tie:in agreements). 
264. See Gerard Hoberg & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Underwriters Collaborate with 
Venture Capitalists in IPOs? Implications and Evidence 6-7 (Apr. 26, 2005) (unpublished 
comment), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=690421 (describing arrangements). 
265. See Olaf Ehrhardt & Henry Lahr, Private Benefits and the Decision to Go Public 
9, 56-57 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=885721 (noting that some 
"argue that investors are too optimistic [and t)herefore, IPOs are overpriced"); see also 
Tim Loughran & Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 23, 28-29 (1995) 
(showing abnormally low post-IPO stock price performance). 
266. See Patricia M. Dechow et al., The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-
Term Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings, CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 1, 17 (2000) ("[A)ffiliated analysts make the most overly optimistic forecasts."); Rani 
Michaely & Kent L. Womack, Conflicts of Interest and the Credibility of Underwriter 
Analyst Recommendations, 12 REV. FIN. STUD. 653, 653-55 (1999). 
267. See Maureen F. McNichols et al., That Ship Has Sailed: Unaffiliated Analysts' 
Recommendation Performance for IPO Firms 2-3 (March 2006), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=892633 (describing legal and regulatory changes and reporting 
no difference between affiliated and unaffiliated analysts' recommendations between 1994 
and 2001). 
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typical investment in an IP0.268 Any effort by an underwriter or 
issuer to inform buyers about the value of unique governance 
features would be suspect as self-serving. Independent analysts 
do not evaluate corporate governance. There are no recognized 
independent experts who could be hired to certify the value of an 
unusual governance feature. It would be difficult for a would-be 
expert to establish a track record since the value of an attractive 
corporate governance regime will typically not be realized for 
many years. 
The need to educate would not end with the IPO; to keep the 
benefit of a governance feature in its stock price in the 
aftermarket, the issuer would have to inform investors 
continually about that feature. Further, the issuer is a one-time 
player. It would bear all the costs of verifying the value of the 
feature; later issuers could free-ride on this effort. The 
underwriter is a repeat player and so might have an incentive to 
provide credible certification of the value of a corporate 
governance plan. To do so, however, would be awkward because 
it would tacitly devalue the underwriter's other clients who lack 
such a plan. 
In most IPOs the issuer's officers and its venture capital 
investors retain a majority of the shares after the offering.269 
Accordingly, they would not only have to persuade purchasers of 
the value of their governance structure but also pledge not to 
change it after the IPO. They could do this with a charter clause 
requiring a supermajority shareholder vote to amend the 
structure. 270 This would complicate and increase the cost of both 
corporate planning and of the explanation effort. It would also 
lock the firm into rules that might have unexpected 
consequences. Moreover, the forms ATPs take are varied and 
constantly evolving, so a commitment precluding just one set of 
ATPs would be of little value. Finally, takeovers, even if 
relatively unimpeded, are only a partial cure for the ills of 
separation of ownership and control. Devices to commit to 
268. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in 
Corporate Contracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate''), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 733-36 
(1997) (describing network externalities that encourage standardization in corporate 
contracts). In particular, the value sacrificed by ATPs varies among companies, and it 
would be costly to calculate separately the amount lost in each IPO. See Klausner, supra 
note 237, at 776-77. 
269. But see Daines, supra note 22, at 1560 (suggesting that "an IPO cuts managers' 
ownership by roughly 50%," and that this reduction therefore decrease the managers' 
incentive to improve corporate governance). 
270. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216 (2001 & Supp. 2006) (permitting provision in 
certificate of incorporation requiring supermajority board or shareholder vote for 
stipulated matters). 
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shareholder control may be on the horizon, but they do not exist 
yet. 
The recent growth of governance ratings agencies and proxy 
advisors is making investors better informed about each issuer's 
governance.271 In time, this trend may change the governance of 
IPO firms. Until recently, "institutional investors were 
apparently unaware of the fact that companies were going public 
with takeover defenses in their charters."272 This fact is now 
getting more attention. As awareness dawns, investors are 
registering dissatisfaction with it. 273 For now, however, the 
governance of IPO firms is far from optimal. 
C. The Market for State Law 
The argument that states compete to offer the most investor-
friendly corporate law is also fatally flawed. The "market" for 
corporate law has major barriers to entry that keep other states 
from challenging Delaware's dominance. 274 If another state 
adopted a law appealing enough to attract many companies to 
incorporate there, Delaware could just copy the attractive 
features. 275 It is also unclear what features are appealing in this 
market. Since CEOs now dominate most public companies, any 
competition among the states may just cater to CEOs.276 
Any constraint on Delaware corporate law from other 
jurisdictions probably stems less from other states than from the 
271. See infra notes 314-21 and accompanying text. 
272. Klausner, supra note 237, at 764; see also Bebchuk, supra note 224, at 740-42 
(discussing the role of bounded rationality in IPO pricing). 
273. See Klausner, supra note 237, at 765-68. 
274. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: 
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 563, 568-71 
(2002); see also Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Nlysterious Race to 
the Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL 'y REV. 381, 382 (2005) (questioning whether there is a 
race to either the top or the bottom). Delaware is chosen by 95% of firms that incorporate 
outside their home state. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of !PO Firms, 77 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1563 (2002). 
275. See Michael Abramowicz, Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 
139, 164 (2003). 
276. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Market for Corporate Law, 162 J. lNST'L & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 134 (2006) (finding that state competition produces optimal 
governance rules only to the extent they preserve managers' private benefits). This 
hypothesis is supported by evidence that incorporation in Delaware is not associated with 
higher firm value, as one would expect if Delaware law were better for investors. Lucian 
Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. 
REV. 1775, 1788-90 (2002); Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 41, 46 (2004) (finding no evidence of such a correlation in the 1990s 
except for firms with small market value). 
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threat of federal regulation. 277 This threat may help to explain the 
wild fluctuations in Delaware law. When the federal government 
shows interest in increasing corporate governance regulation, 
Delaware courts move to obviate it by tightening their standards. 
When the heat abates, they revert to their usual laxity. When 
federal action loomed in the 1980s, the Delaware Supreme Court 
ratcheted up the duty of care-or seemed to do so-by holding 
directors liable in Smith v. Van Gorkom,278 even though their 
behavior was well within normal practices. Once the danger 
passed, state courts forgot Van Gorkom; no director was careless 
enough to be held liable.279 When Enron and other scandals 
provoked demands that directors be required to exercise at least 
a little oversight, the Delaware Supreme Court again made some 
noise (albeit only in dictum) about a more stringent duty of 
care.
280 This pattern belies claims that courts are better than 
legislatures or the market at protecting shareholders.281 
D. Counter-Evidence: Shareholder Influence and Share Prices 
Companies with strong shareholder protections have higher 
share prices than companies with weak shareholder rights.282 The 
former also have superior operating perfonnance.283 They invest 
277. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591-92 (2003). 
278. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-74 (Del. 1985). 
279. In 1999, the Delaware Supreme Court said that directors breach the duty of 
care only if their conduct is "so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that it 
seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith." Parnes v. Bally 
Entm't Corp., 722 A.2d 1243, 1246 (Del. 1999) (quoting In re J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 542 
A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988)); see also E. Norman Veasey, Musings on the Dynamics 
of Corporate Governance Issues, Director Liability Concerns, Corporate Control 
Transactions, Ethics, and Federalism, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2003) ("If the board's 
decision or conduct is irrational or so beyond reason that no reasonable director would 
credit the decision or conduct, lack of good faith may, in some circumstances, be 
inferred."). 
280. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) ("[D]irectors' decisions will 
be respected by courts unless the directors act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a 
rational business purpose .... "). 
281. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition 
for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1072 (2000) (finding courts limited by 
their reluctance to respond to political changes, their inability to set their own agendas, 
and their constraints on justiciability). 
282. For example, companies that opted out of Pennsylvania's extreme antitakeover 
law were valued in the market at a multiple on cash flows 25% higher than companies 
that did not opt out. See JACOBS, supra note 130, at 250 n.5 (citing John Pound, On 
Motives for Choosing a Corporate Governance Structure: A Study of Corporate Reaction to 
the Pennsylvania Takeover Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 656, 668-69 (1992)). 
283. See Lin, supra note 158, at 922 (citing empirical evidence that appointment of 
outside directors positively impacts stock prices); Tod Perry & Anil Shivdasani, Do Boards 
Affect Performance? Evidence from Corporate Restructuring, 78 J. Bus. 1403, 1418-20 
(2005) (finding that firms without a majority of outside directors are more likely to 
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more with more efficiency.284 They have lower CEO compensation.285 
Further, countries with corporate laws that do not protect 
shareholders tend to have weak stock markets. This suggests that 
shareholder protections reduce agency costs.286 
When large shareholders do exert influence, they do not usurp 
benefits for themselves; all shareholders gain from the activism of 
large shareholders. Initiatives undertaken by CalPERS, for 
instance, have generated superior market returns.287 The presence 
of large block holders often improves firm performance. 288 High 
initiate asset restructurings and employee layoffs and that the reduction in the scale of 
operations is larger for these firms than for other firms and that such firms are more 
likely to improve performance after a restructuring); Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. 
Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Operating Performance 13 (Mar. 20, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=814205 (finding that 
several proshareholder governance criteria are associated with higher returns on equity 
and on assets); Henry Huang, Shareholder Rights and the Cost of Equity Capital29 (Aug. 
2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) ("My findings indicate that the 
level of shareholder rights is significantly associated with the cost of equity capital. 
Investors perceive the weak shareholder rights as an important source of potential agency 
costs and demand higher rates of return accordingly."); see also John E. Core et al., Does 
Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating 
Performance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655, 659-61 (2006) (stating that 
securities analysts weigh shareholder rights when making earnings forecasts). 
284. See B!<lhren et al., supra note 140, at 2, 3, 18 ("[B]etter governance improves 
investment efficiency by mitigating the underinvestment problem [and] the 
overinvestment problem ... relative to the first best solution .... "). 
285. See Jiraporn et al., supra note 213, at 248 ("[W]ealrer shareholder rights (more 
suppressive governance) are related to higher executive pay."). 
286. There is some question whether strong (or weak) governance causes superior (or 
inferior) performance. "It is also possible that the results are driven by some unobservable 
firm characteristic." Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 
Q.J. ECON. 107, 145 (2003). A recent empirical study suggests that is the case. N.K 
Chidambaran et al., Does Better Corporate Governance "Cause" Better Firm 
Performance? 43-44 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=891556. Laws that protect investors are associated with higher 
national economic growth. Rui Castro et al., Investor Protection, Optimal Incentives, and 
Economic Growth, 119 Q.J. ECON. 1131, 1131-35, 1166-67 (2004). 
287. See MONKS & MINow, supra note 67, at 157 (citing Stephen L. Nesbitt, Long 
Term Rewards from Corporate Governance, Wilshire Assocs. (Jan. 5, 1994)); Mark Anson 
et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of CalPERS Focus List, 15 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 
102, 103-05 (2003); Brad M. Barber, Monitoring the Monitor: Evaluating CalPERS' 
Shareholder Activism 2 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=890321 (finding that CalPERS's activism resulted in total wealth 
creation of $3.1 billion between 1992 and 2005); see also MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67, 
at 157 (discussing other examples of similar increase in shareholder value from actions at 
Sears, Roebuck, and Honeywell); Meet the Friendly Corporate Raiders, Bus. WK., Sept. 20, 
2004, at 102 (describing success of Relational Investing fund in pressuring 
underperforming companies to change). 
288. See ROE, supra note 119, at 237-38 (arguing that block-holders' presence 
personifies the shareholders, which spurs executive performance, promotes ''loyalty," and 
discourages "shirking''); Paul A. Gompers & Andrew Metrick, Institutional Investors and 
Equity Prices, 116 Q.J. ECON. 229, 229-30 (2001) (finding higher stock returns between 
1980 and 1996 for companies with large institutional ownership). 
) 
f 
2008] ACADEMICS IN WONDERLAND 1263 
institutional stock ownership is not associated with decreases in 
R&D.289 Strong shareholders may even benefit bondholders. 290 
E. Counter-Evidence: Leveraged Buyouts and Acquisitions 
There is much debate about the source of premiums in 
acquisitions,291 but most commentators believe that some or most 
of them stem from eliminating the large agency costs of the 
separation of ownership and control. 292 In leveraged buyouts 
("LEOs") a private group acquires a public company, typically 
paying a large premium for its stock.293 Neither the direct costs of 
being a public company (like the costs of proxy statements and 
SEC filings) nor the tax savings of high leverage explain these 
premiums.294 What does? Michael Jensen posits that going 
private removes huge agency costs that beset public firms. 295 On 
one hand, the high debt of LBO firms poses a threat of default 
that deters managers from the waste that plagues many public 
companies. 296 On the other hand, managers of LBO firms usually 
own a large share of the equity, which gives them strong 
incentives to increase share value.297 As a result, LEOs improve 
ffi . 298 e c1ency. 
289. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, 
INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP, TENDER OFFERS, AND LONG-TERM INvESTMENTS 6-7 (1985). 
290. See Angie Low et al., The Impact of Shareholder Power on Bondholders: 
Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions 9, 37-38 (Mar. 13, 2006) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=891683 (showing that high 
institutional ownership is positively related to bondholder returns of the acquiring 
company in acquisitions). 
291. See Bainbridge, supra note 9, at 617-22 (noting that there is no unified theory 
on the source of high premiums in merger and acquisition transactions). 
292. See id. at 617-20. 
293. See DALE A OESTERLE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS IN A NUTSHELL 27-28 (2d 
ed. 2006) (describing method for performing a leveraged buyout). 
294. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 202, at 404-06. 
295. See Michael Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REV., Sept.-
Oct. 1989, at 61 ('The publicly held corporation ... has outlived its usefulness in many 
sectors of the economy ... [because of] the central weakness of the public corporation-
the conflict between owners and managers over the control and use of corporate 
resources .... "). Although public ownership will not disappear, the LBO trend continues. 
Id. at 62-66. 
296. See Jensen, supra note 142, at 322-23. 
297. Managers of LBO firms often own 15-20% of the equity. I d. at 323. This 
contrasts with the one-fourth of 1% of the equity owned by the average CEO of a Fortune 
500 company. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
298. See Frank R. Lichtenberg & Donald Siegel, The Effects of Leveraged Buyouts on 
Productivity and Related Aspects of Firm Behavior, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 165, 165-67, 184-93 
(1990) (finding higher productivity after an LBO and that this result was not attributable 
to reduced research and development, wages, capital investment, or layoffs of blue collar 
workers); see also Richard Harris et al., Assessing the Impact of Management Buyouts on 
Economic Efficiency: Plant-Level Evidence from the United Kingdom, 87 REV. ECON. & 
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The existence of acquisitions (including LEOs) also helps to 
explain why the market has not demanded shareholder primacy. 
Unlike public shareholders, an acquirer has no collective action 
problem; it captures all the gains from improving corporate 
governance. Accordingly, it makes sense that a sophisticated 
investor who sees inefficient govemance would not wage a proxy 
fight for control of public companies or seek IPOs by companies 
with better governance. By those steps, the investor would incur 
large costs (of investigation in the case of IPOs, or of a proxy 
solicitation) but reap little gain. It makes more sense for 
shareholders to wait for an offer of a premium by an acquirer 
who can take control and keep all the remaining gains.299 
V. GOTTERDAMMERUNG: TRENDS ERODING DIRECTOR PRilVIACY 
A. Growing Shareholder Activism 
Economic and legal trends are increasing shareholder 
power.300 Pace the DPM theorists, shareholders did not choose 
impotence; it was forced on them.301 Now they are gaining power, 
albeit slowly.302 High-profile merger disasters and corporate 
STAT. 148, 152-53 (2005) (making similar findings in the U.K); Shaker A. Zahra, 
Corporate Entrepreneurship and Financial Performance: The Case of Management and 
Leveraged Buyouts, 10 J. Bus. VENTURING 225, 238 (1995) (finding significant increases in 
new product development and other aspects of corporate entrepreneurship after LEOs). 
299. This is not to say that LEOs entirely solve the problem of CEO domination. 
[M]aybe it's that [LEOs] are often done with the help of the acquired entity, 
where the managers know exactly how to change the company and make it 
worth more, but want to put that knowledge to work only if they can reap 
immense rewards from the repair job. That often seems to be what's happening. 
Ben Stein, What Is This Thing Called Private Equity?, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2007, § 3, at 6. 
300. See William T. Allen & Leo E. Strine, Jr., When the Existing Economic Order 
Deserves a Champion: The Enduring Relevance of Martin Lipton's Vision of the Corporate 
Law, 60 Bus. LAw. 1383, 1395 (2005) (stating that increasing product competition and the 
growing power of institutional investors and securities markets are forcing changes in 
corporate governance). 
301. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (concerning executive compensation 
consultants); supra notes 208-43 and accompanying text (describing obstacles to 
shareholder control). 
302. See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: }'yfaking Institutional Investor Activism a 
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 175 (2001) 
("Institutional investors have, in the past decade, increasingly engaged in corporate 
governance activities .... "). Shareholder proposals are gaining greater support. With 
growing frequency managements substantially accept them. For example, rules requiring 
a majority (rather than a plurality) shareholder vote for the election of directors are being 
adopted at "breathtaking speed." See Denise F. Brown, Study Shows Majority Voting 
Continue to Gain Momentum, 5 BNA CORP. ACCOUNTABILITY REP'T 190, 190 (Feb. 23, 
2007). This shows that "in the battle between owners and managers ... investors are 
gaining power." Jena McGregor, Activist Investors Get /yfore Respect, Bus. WK., June 11, 
2007, at 34. 
i-:5 
to 
;y. 
on 
tte 
ed 
xy 
tes 
:ur 
xy 
for 
:er 
y 
ler 
>Se 
er, 
l.te 
1ra, 
md 
sin 
6. 
·der 
-ate 
the 
:;in 
lion 
to 
na 
)01) 
cate 
vith 
cing 
ling 
ting 
23, 
are 
11, 
2008] ACADEMICS IN WONDERLAND 1265 
scandals "have made shareholders more cynical about the 
decision-making process of boards of directors."303 The SEC's 1992 
proxy rule changes also made it easier for institutional investors 
to communicate and cooperate.304 A recent court decision may 
foster further shareholder involvement in board elections.305 
There is continuing growth in the fraction of public stocks held 
by institutional investors generally and by public pension funds 
and other institutions that are less subject to pressure from 
306 
corporate managers. 
Hedge funds have grown, and their activism in corporate 
governance is more intense and goes further than that of other 
institutional investors.307 Hedge funds band together and recruit 
other institutional investors for group action.308 They often "try to 
persuade managers to change the capital structure of the 
company (typically to pay substantial dividends, repurchase 
shares, or take on additional debt) in ways the hedge funds 
believe will maximize the value of shares."309 They have been so 
successful as to "supportD the proposition that they have shifted 
the balance of corporate power in the direction of outside 
shareholders and their fmancial agendas ... [perhaps heralding] 
a modification of the prevailing description of a separation of 
h . d t 1 ~00 owners 1p an con ro .... 
303. Young, supra note 123. 
304. See Briggs, supra note 15.2, at 686-89. 
305. See Am. Fed. of State, County & Mun. Employees v. Am. Int'l Group, Inc., 462 
F. 3d 121, 125, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2006) (ordering inclusion on company's proxy statement of 
shareholder proposals relating to elections of directors generally). 
306. In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001 they held 
61%. See SEC. INDUS. AsS'N, SECURITIES lNDUSTRYFACTBOOK2002, at 66 (2002). 
307. See Kahan & Rock, supra note 123, at 4-18. This is a result of different 
economic incentives and lower regulatory constraints and conflicts of interest. I d. at 19-
25; see also Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 156, at 43 (stating that "hedge fund corporate 
governance activism is more robust"); Young, supra note 123 (describing growing 
leadership by hedge funds to oppose value-impairing deals in proxy votes and noting that, 
because of their fee structures, hedge fund managers "maintain a laser focus on 
shareholder value"). 
308. See Briggs, supra note 152, at 690-92, 697-98 (describing "wolf pack tactics"). 
309. Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 156, at 35. 
310. William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J. 1375, 
1409 (2007); see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 721 ("[H]edge funds with significant 
shareholdings have been able to use wolf-pack tactics against companies to achieve at 
least some oftheir aims."). 
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Investor sophistication is rising,311 making it easier for 
shareholders to coordinate and raising the payoff to activism by 
increasing the power they can exert if they do cooperate. 
Investors and regulators are paying more attention to proxy 
voting by fiduciaries. "Today, institutional shareholders who 
consistently defer to management (the modus operandi of the 
past) may be accused of abdicating their fiduciary duties."312 It is 
now harder for managers to intimidate shareholders who vote 
against them. In sum, the incentives for shareholder initiative 
are growing. This rising activism has already benefited firms' 
performance and share values; 313 as the trend continues, the 
benefits should also grow. 
Both a cause and an effect of mounting shareholder energy is 
the growth of shareholder advisory organizations and lobbying 
groups. The foremost is Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), 
which may guide over a third of the shareholder votes. 314 A 
similar organization, International Corporate Governance 
Network (ICGN), now operates transnationally.315 These advisors 
have a significant impact on proxy votes.316 
ISS has also created its Corporate Governance Quotient, 
which rates the corporate governance systems of public 
companies.317 The Council of Institutional Investors also 
311. See Angela Morgan et al., The Evolution of Shareholder Voting for Executive 
Compensation Schemes, 21 J. CORP. FIN. 715, 715, 723 (2006) (concluding that 
"shareholders have become more sensitive to potentially harmful [executive 
compensation] plan provisions"); Rock, supra note 116, at 447-51 (describing examples of 
informed activism by institutional shareholders). 
312. Young, wpra note 123. 
313. See supra notes 282-89 and accompanying text; see also Romano, supra note 
302, at 183 (stating that institutional investors have targeted poorly performing 
corporations). 
314. See Dean Starkman, A Proxy Adviser's Two Sides: Some Question Work of ISS 
for Companies It Scrutinizes, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2006, at Dl. According to its 
president, 15-20% of ISS clients automatically vote according to ISS reconnendations. 
Id.; see also Briggs, supra note 152, at 692-93, 698-99 (describing the operations and 
effectiveness of ISS). Glass, Lewis & Co. also offers research and advice to institutional 
investors. See Glass, Lewis & Co., Board Accountability Index, http://www.glasslewis.com/ 
solutions/bai.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2007); see also Rose, supra note 245, at 904 
(describing services offered by Glass, Lewis, & Co. and explaining the functions of the 
Board Accountability Index). 
315. See Rose, supra note 245, at 897. 
316. See Jennifer E. Bethel & Stuart L. Gillan, The Impact of Institutional and 
Regulatory Environment on Shareholder Voting, 31 FIN. MGMT. J. 29, 30, 34 (2002); see 
also TONELLO, supra note 146, at 24 ("Recently, these organizations have focused 
increasing attention on what they consider to be unjustified and excessive compensation, 
thereby contributing to raising the 'best practice' bar."). 
317. See Rose, wpra note 245, at 900-03; Institutional Shareholder Services, Rating 
Criteria, http://www.isscgq.com/RatingCriteria.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2007) (listing 
sixty-one rating criteria used in the CGQ). An index of twenty-four of these features 
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publishes corporate governance guidelines.318 Governance Metrics 
International (GMI) and the Corporate Library CCL) also rate the 
governance structures of public companies.319 Going farther, some 
institutional investors are joining forces to participate directly in 
corporate governance. 320 Shareholder activism will be facilitated 
by organizations like the new Investors for Director 
Accountability, which plans to coordinate institutional 
shareholders in order to "press directors to act in the interests of 
the stockholders."321 
Some objections are leveled at these organizations. One is 
that ISS has a conflict of interest because, in addition to the 
foregoing activities, it offers advice to public companies, 
"which creates a concern that ISS'[s] recommendations in a 
proxy matter may be affected by whether or not the subject 
company purchases other services from ISS, such as 
governance advice."322 It is also charged that the ratings of 
these organizations "do not reliably predict firm 
f ,323 per ormance. 
These concerns are not fanciful. Conflicts of interest are 
ubiquitous m corporate governance, infecting not only 
directors, but also accountants, investment advisors, 
compensation advisors, and institutional investors 
themselves. 324 It would almost be surprising to find an aspect of 
corporate governance in which there are no conflicts of 
relating to shareholder power has been found to be positively associated with several 
measures of superior corporate performance. See Gompers et al., supra note 286, at 145-
50. 
318. See COUNCJL OF INSTITUTIONAL INvESTORS, CORPORATE GoVERNANCE POLICillS 
(2006), http://www.cii.org/policies/Current%20CII%20Corporate%20Governance%20 
Policies%2003-20.-07. pdf. 
319. See GovernanceMetrics International, Overview, http://www.gmiratings.com 
!hgwaa055h0jyiu55scbird45)/About.aspx#top (last visited Oct. 19, 2007); see also Rose, 
supra note 245, at 903-04 (discussing GMI and CL). 
320. See Mara Der Hovanesian, Attack of the Hungry Hedge Funds, Bus. WK., Feb. 
20, 2006, at 72 (describing coordinated efforts, including the seeking of board seats). In 
some cases shareholders have formed groups to help explain the complex, abstruse 
financial information disclosed by public companies. See Gretchen Morgenson, Hear Ye, 
Hear Ye: Corralling Executive Pay, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2007, § 3, at 1 (describing 
formation of group ofVerizon Communications shareholders). 
321. Gretchen Morgenson, Fund Manager, It's Time to Pick a Side, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
26, 2006, § 3, at 1. 
322. Rose, supra note 245, at 906. 
323. Id. at 908; see also Jeffrey Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading 
Myths of Bad Metrics, AcAD. OF MGMT. EXEC., Feb. 2004, at 108, 108 (claiming that 
ratings are based on "Wall Street superstitions" and "cliches and myths, rather than on 
genuine research"). 
324. See supra notes 249-50, 266 and accompanying text (concerning investment 
advisors). 
1268 HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [44:5 
interest. However, recent studies find a significant correlation 
between at least some of these agencies' ratings factors and 
corporate performance.325 No doubt further research can 
improve these correlations. There is room for disagreement 
about the criterion by which correlation should be sought.326 
However, the widespread use of the services of these 
organizations by institutional investors indicates powerfully 
that they find the services beneficial. 
The market is already addressing these conflicts of 
interest.327 If the market cannot solve the problems, regulation 
may be needed,328 although regulation is always costly and not 
always beneficial. Given the recent effectiveness of ratings and 
advisory services in aiding shareholders, nothing should be done 
to hamper their continued growth. 
More shareholder proposals are gaining majority 
shareholder support. 329 Boards once routinely ignored them.330 
Now they pay more heed and implement more shareholder-
approved proposals. 331 ''Vote No" campaigns in which disgruntled 
shareholders withhold their votes for some or all board nominees 
increase the odds of CEO turnover (which usually raises share 
price), even though these campaigns do not directly alter board 
composition.332 Shareholder pressure to declassify boards and to 
remove poison pills is increasingly successful.333 New regulations 
325. See supra notes 212, 282 and accompanying text. 
326. Various studies have used return on equity, return on assets, accounting 
profitability, and cost of capital. See supra notes 212-14, 223-25 and accompanying text 
(referring to various measures of corporate performance). 
327. Rose, supra note 245, at 907 ("[L]arge, institutional investors ... have raised 
concerns and, in some cases, switched advisors over conflicts issue."). 
328. See id. at 919-26 (discussing the possibility of regulation). 
329. See supra note 237 and accompanying text (noting the growing success of 
shareholder opposition to anti takeover devices). 
330. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 237, at 370-71. 
331. See id. at 369. 
332. See Diane Del Guercio et al., Do Boards Pay Attention When Institutional 
Investors 'Just Vote No'?: CEO and Director Turnover Associated with Shareholder 
Activism 1-2, 23 (2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstract=575242. 
333. See Thomas & Cotter, supra note 237, at 377-79 ("The number of [poison] pill 
redemptions and board declassifications increased substantially in 2004."). One study 
found that, of fifty companies that had approved a (precatory) shareholder proposal to 
declassify the board between 2004 and 2005, fifteen (30%) did so. Ganor, supra note 62, at 
14. More boards are responding to shareholder pressure to remove poison pills despite 
management opposition to removal. See Ali C. Akyol & Carolyn A. Carroll, Removing 
Poison Pills: A Case of Shareholder Activism 9-13 (Sept. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), 
available at http://ssm.com/abstrct=935950. 
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that enhance board oversight seem to have caused a reduction in 
CEO compensation.334 
More shareholders are proposing by-law amendments.335 
Hitherto shareholders typically braved only precatory proposals, 
which boards regularly disregarded. By-law amendments are still 
imperfect tools; by-laws cannot achieve many protections 
investors need, and some companies require unattainable 
supermajority votes to amend the by-laws.336 Still, this tactic 
allows investors to take one more step forward. If they are again 
frustrated, they will seek other means to defend themselves. 
B. Growing Competition for Capital 
"[I]n order to compete for capital, corporations will have to 
give investors more of a role in governance."337 In America, the 
huge advantage that public equities once enjoyed over other 
investments is shrinking, and that trend is likely to continue. 
One growing competitor is private equity.338 DPMtrPM advocates 
are so baffled by this development that they offer stmmingly 
obtuse explanations for it. Lynn Stout says, "The recent boom in 
private equity buyouts suggests that the modern trend toward 
greater shareholder power and protection has already gone too 
far."339 "[P]ublic shareholders may have made themselves so 
bothersome that many corporate managers simply do not want to 
deal with them."340 It's unclear whether the recognition that the 
managers, not the directors, are calling the shots is a conscious 
confession or a slip of the pen. 
In any case, a much more persuasive explanation for the 
trend is available: Through venture capital and leveraged 
buyouts, large investors can escape the abuse they suffer in 
334. See Vidhi Chhaochharia & Y aniv Grinstein, CEO Compensation and Board 
Structure 19 (Oct. 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=901642 (finding that firms that had not previously complied with the new rules 
decreased their CEO compensation by 20-25% upon compliance compared to firms that 
were already complying). 
335. See Mark Maremont & Erin White, Stock Activism's Latest Weapon, WALL ST. 
J., Apr. 4, 2006, at Cl. 
336. See id. 
337. MONKS & MINOW, supra note 67, at 156. 
338. See William J. Holstein, The Rising Role Of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 
2006, § 3, at 9 (interviewing Robert F. Bruner, Dean of the Darden School of Business at 
the University of Virginia, about the role of private equity firms in merger and acquisition 
transactions). 
339. Lynn A. Stout, Democracy by Proxy, WALL ST. J., March 8, 2007, at A16. 
340. Lynn A. Stout, Investors Who Are Too Bolshy for Their Own Good, FIN. TIMES, 
Apr. 22, 2007, at 9. 
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public companies and exert real control. This is a primary motive 
for the growth of private equity.341 
Foreign firms and securities markets are also becoming 
more competitive. America still compares favorably to other 
countries as a place to invest. "In fact, the U.S. [stock] market 
has generated retums at least as high as those of the European 
and Pacific markets" in every five-year period in the last twenty-
five years. 342 However, we cannot be complacent. Better 
shareholder protection is making many countries more appealing 
to investors. 343 Now, "the law on shareholder protection in the US 
is weaker than the law [of several other countries]."344 Americans 
are investing more of their money overseas.345 
C. Stakeholders and Social Responsibility Under Shareholder 
Primacy 
Increasing shareholder power poses no threat to stakeholders 
(other than CEOs). Pursuit of profit motivates shareholders to treat 
341. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Symposium on Corporate Elections 17 (N at'l Center 
of Econ. Res., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 448, Nov. 2003), available at 
http://ssm.com/abstact=471640 (claiming that excessive executive compensation in public 
companies in effect imposes a 10% annual tax on shareholder and offering this as an 
explanation for the growth of private equity). 
342. Holmstrom & Kaplan, supra note 180, at 9. The performance was not limited to 
financial markets: from 1992 to 2000, "growth in GDP per capita was greater in the U.S. 
than in France, Germany, Great Britain, or Japan." Id. at 10. 
343. See Priya P. Lele & Mathias M. Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric 
Approach, 7 J. CORP. L. STUD. 17, 30-33, 43 (2007) (concluding, through the use of 
"leximetrics," that Germany, France, United Kingdom, and India have stronger 
shareholder protection laws than the United States); Eric Pan, Why the World No Longer 
Puts Its Stock in Us 1-3, 11-12 (Benjamin N .. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 
176, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=951705 (stating that U.S. markets are no 
longer unique; foreign competition is growing and fewer foreign companies are using U.S. 
equity markets). In general, there is a world-wide trend toward the shareholder primacy 
model. See Marc Goergen et al., Corporate Governance Convergence: Evidence from 
Takeover Regulation Reforms in Europe, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL 'y 243, 243-44 (2005); 
Kamar, supra note 50, at 1757-58 (describing a "trend toward shareholder protection" in 
the European Union). 
344. Lele & Siems, supra note 343, at 43 (comparing the law of the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, and India). Colin S. Melvin, director of corporate 
govemance for a large British money manager, says that ''the U.S. is probably one of the most 
difficult environments" for shareholders ''to work with companies to improve corporate 
govemance." Gretchen Morgenson, Belated Apologies in Proxy Land, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2006, § 3, at 1. By measures developed by the World Bank, the United States now ranks below 
average in investor protection. See SIMEON DJANKOV ET. AL, THE LAW AND EcONOMICS OF 
SELF-DEALING 52-80 (2006), available at http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/ 
Protecting-Investors-Self-Dealing.pdf; see also No Deomocracy, Please, We're 
Shareholders, THE ECONOMIST, May 1, 2004, at 13 (stating that shareholder democracy is 
weaker in the United States than in the United Kingdom). 
345. See Pan, supra note 343, at 9-11. 
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employees fairly. 346 Shareholder primacy would not increase 
corporate lawbreaking. 347 Shareholder primacy could reduce 
corporate philanthropy as directors become less free with the 
shareholders' money. However, the decline should be minor-
"independent" boards tend to serve CEOs, not the public interest. 
In fact, shareholder primacy will benefit society generally. 
Rising corporate profits and dividends mean higher tax receipts. 
Greater business efficiency and innovation will be pursued for 
the benefit of shareholders, but through the "invisible hand" this 
will expand the economy, bringing higher wages and better goods 
and services at lower prices.348 Peter Kostant, a fan of the TPM, 
discusses corporate governance in terms of Rawls's concept of 
fairness. 349 Standing behind Rawls's "veil of ignorance," a rational 
person would choose shareholder primacy over other governance 
models because it benefits everyone (except CEOs). Kostant 
decries the excessive political power of CE0s350 and praises the 
TPM's potential to curb CEOs.351 In fact, "independent" boards do 
not curb but magnify CEO power. Even progressives should 
prefer shareholder primacy, which really reins in CEOs. 
D. Shareholder Nominating Committees 
A principal obstacle to shareholder primacy 1s that a 
corporation's "official" nominees for election to the board are 
chosen by a committee of incumbent directors.352 Since most 
boards are dominated by the CEO, most committees choose 
nominees who, like themselves, accept CEO primacy. In this 
system, legislation cannot create true board independence but 
only reduce formal contacts. 
346. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
34 7. There are a growing number of large private companies in which the board is 
chosen by one or a few dominant shareholders. See supra note 338 and accompanying 
text. Nonetheless, all the recent scandals over false financials and back-dating and 
spring-loading of executive stock options have involved public companies with a majority 
of "independent" directors. See supra note 100. Director "independence" obviously does not 
reduce law-breaking, and may increase it. See supra notes 158-82 and accompanying text. 
348. See Michael Bradley et al., The Purpose and Accountability of the Corporation in 
Contemporary Society, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 36-38 (1999) ("[M]aximizing the 
residual claim of a public corporation in turn maximizes the clain!s of all 
stakeholders .... "); Mcintosh, supra note 108, at 68 (stating that shareholder wealth 
maximization is the goal that is ''likely, in the greatest number of cases to result in global 
wealth maximization"). 
349. Kostant, supra note 2, at 698-99. 
350. Id. at 680, 695. 
351. Id. at 671. 
352. See Cai et al., supra note 72, at 6 n.8 (''Under NYSE rules after SOX, the 
nomination committee, comprised entirely of outside directors, is charged with identifYing 
qualified board candidates.") 
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The best way to make directors responsive to shareholders is 
to have them chosen by the shareholders. Accordingly, I have 
proposed that official nominees for the board be chosen by a 
committee comprising the ten to twenty largest shareholders.353 I 
will not repeat my prior argument for this proposal, but merely 
address concerns about it that might be intensified by the 
growing power and activism of institutional investors. First, the 
need to gain a majority vote on this committee for any nominee 
would virtually preclude the selection of nominees expected to 
serve the special wishes of one or a few shareholders (like a 
union or state pension fund). 
Could committee members plot a pump-and-dump scheme 
in which their lackeys on the board have the firm spread 
misleading news so as to raise its stock price and allow 
committee members to sell their stock at an inflated price? 
This would require cooperation from dozens of directors and 
officers risking severe civil and criminal penalties, all of whom 
would presumably demand rich compensation. Small incidents 
of insider trading often go undetected, but a campaign of this 
magnitude would be almost impossible to execute without 
discovery. Knowing that only one conspirator would have to 
blow their cover to inculpate all, prudent people would refuse 
to help. More generally, the only corporate goal likely to 
command support from a majority of the members of the 
committee would be maximization of share price. 
Individual committee members might hope to profit from 
self-dealing. However, the interest of any director in a 
transaction must be disclosed to the other directors. 354 Apart 
from concerns about legality, directors would resist any action 
that would injure their reputations and chances for more or 
better directorships. In the current reign of CEO primacy, 
directors polish their reputations by toadying to the CEO. 
Under shareholder primacy, directors would cultivate a 
reputation for serving investors by maximizing share value. 
Efforts of committee members to extract inside information 
from directors would fail for similar reasons. 
Of course, corruption infects every system that relies on 
fallible humans. With shareholder nominating committees, 
however, self-dealing, insider trading, and stock manipulation 
should be no greater than they are now, if only because the 
logistics would be more complicated for committee members 
353. See Dent, supra note 169, at 67-75. 
354. See CLARK, supra note 208, at 171-72 (stating that director must disclose at 
least the underlying facts of a self-interested transaction). 
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than they are for the inside officers who now dominate 
corporations. Other problems, like excessive, poorly designed 
executive compensation, perquisites, and management slack 
should shrink under shareholder nominating committees. In 
sum, the proposal offers to investors higher share prices and to 
the overall economy greater efficiency and international 
attraction of more capital. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The director primacy and team production models of 
corporate governance offer false descriptions of current reality-
independent boards do not control most public corporations now, 
CEOs do. CEO domination exacts a huge toll on stock values. 
Some of this lost wealth is diverted to executives; much of it is 
simply lost through inefficiency. Little or none of it trickles down 
to other stakeholders. 
The impotence of outside directors does not stem from 
personal failings or from legislative neglect. Over many decades 
laws have been amended repeatedly in an effort to increase board 
independence, but these efforts have only removed formal 
affiliations between managers and outside directors; they have 
increased board independence little or not at all. Further 
amendments are unlikely to be more successful. Accordingly, we 
can either resign ourselves to CEO domination or transfer power 
to shareholders. Shareholders want to maximize share value, a 
goal that generally coincides with maximizing industrial 
efficiency. Pursuit of that goal will generally benefit other 
corporate constituencies and society as a whole. Certainly, it will 
not make stakeholders worse off than they are now. 
How can shareholder primacy be realized? We should at 
least revise rules that hinder cooperation among shareholders 
and accumulation of large blocks of stock.355 Directors should be 
more readily held accountable in shareholder litigation. 356 Good 
directors will not be deterred from serving on boards or from 
taking rational risks by rules expecting them to act with minimal 
care and competence. Any legitimate concerns about frightening 
them can be addressed by limiting the personal liability of 
directors or eschewing it altogether and resorting to equitable 
relief. 
355. See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. 
356. See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying te».'i (discussing current hindrances 
to shareholder suits). 
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Ultimately, shareholders should have a major, if not 
dominant, role in choosing the board. I have urged that nominees 
for the board of each public company be chosen by a committee 
comprising its largest shareholders.357 Others have suggested 
reforms that are more modest but point in the same direction.356 
For now, there should be a consensus to increase shareholder 
influence. We cannot be certain of our final destination, the 
precise recipe for optimal corporate governance, but we know the 
general direction in which we should head. 
357. See supra note 353 and accompanying text. 
358. See MONKS & MINow, supra note 67, at 168 (urging the creation of shareholder 
committees to "exercise control over the board's priorities and composition"); Bratton, 
supra note 100, at 1337 (arguing there is a need for independently nominated directors); 
William B. Chandler, III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small 
State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 999-1000 (2003) (urging access to corporate proxy 
machinery for insurgents with significant support); Gordon, supra note 100, at 1243 
(proposing a new category of "trustee directors" for audit committees and certain other 
roles); Rock, supra note 116, at 490-504 (describing and praising past use of shareholder 
advisory committees). It is unclear, however, how effective more modest reforms are likely 
to be. See MichaelS. Weisbach, Optimal Executive Compensation vs. Managerial Power: A 
Review of Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried's Pay Without Performance: The Unfulfilled 
Promise of Executive Compensation 14 (Nov. 14, 2006) (unpublished working paper), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=939785 (disagreeing with Bebchuk and Fried's 
argument that "managers effectively set their own pay subject to an outrage constraint"). 
